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ABSTRACT

“FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RELIGION?”:
PSYCHOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE THAT OVERTHREW A GUATEMALAN
GOVERNMENT, 1952-1954

By
Sean F. Thearle
March 2012

Thesis Supervised by Professor John J. Dwyer
In 1954, the United States rescinded its Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin
America when it conducted a covert operation, known as PBSUCCESS, in Guatemala
that forced the resignation of democratically-elected President Jacobo Arbenz. Since
then, scholars have written a wide array of books and articles pertaining to the subject.
While most authors have focused attention on who was to blame for the coup, this
research project takes a new approach by examining the roles of religion and
entertainment in facilitating Arbenz‟s overthrow. Instead of investigating causes or
motives of U.S. intervention, this project seeks to answer questions about the operation
itself. It focuses on the role of culture in covert operations and combines political,
economic, technological, religious, and cultural history to set scholarship on this event in
a new direction.

iv

From April-June 1954, the CIA employed psychological intelligence and
propaganda to quickly destabilize Guatemalan politics. The CIA intelligence gathered
before the psychological warfare campaign was used two ways: first by Catholic priests
in Sunday homilies and second by a clandestine radio station (codenamed SHERWOOD).
Together these forms of propaganda helped sway an ambivalent public (sixty percent of
the Guatemalan population was indifferent toward its leader less than a month before the
launch of the radio station) to support an “invasion” by a band of approximately 1,500
Guatemalan exiles led by Castillo Armas against the sitting government.
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Introduction
On June 27, 1954, a peaceful social revolution in Guatemala came to a screeching
halt when democratically-elected nationalist President Jacobo Arbenz resigned from
office under mounting internal and external pressures. For many of the approximately
three million people living in this small Central American nation in the mid-1950s,
Arbenz‟s resignation arrested an effort begun in 1944 by Guatemalan president Juan
Arévalo to empower the nation‟s landless peasantry and working classes. During this
time, the United States was fully engaged in both a domestic and international ideological
conflict against communism. The Red Scare, as it is popularly called, produced a
hysteria that was exploited by reactionary politicians like Senator Joseph McCarthy of
Wisconsin who brought charges of subversive activity to many government employees,
the film industry, and progressive politicians. This frenzy crossed into American foreign
policy by 1953 as the U.S. helped to orchestrate the overthrow of Prime Minister
Mohammed Mossadeq in Iran and began preparations to carry out a similar operation in
Guatemala against Arbenz. The progressive reforms brought about by Arbenz were seen
by President Dwight Eisenhower‟s administration as the first steps toward the
establishment of a communist beachhead in the Western Hemisphere capable of
spreading to other nations in the circum-Caribbean and threatening U.S. security in the
Panama Canal region.1

1

Preliminary meetings between American ambassador John Peurifoy and Jacobo Arbenz in December
1953 indicated that Arbenz was not a communist but accommodated the communists within Guatemala.
After a six hour dinner meeting with Arbenz and his wife, Peurifoy concluded that Arbenz was “not a
Communist [but] will certainly do until one comes along”. See William Z. Slany, N. Stephen Kane, and
William F. Sanford, Jr., eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume IV: The
American Republics (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983) 1091-1093.
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U.S. policy during the Cold War focused on containing communism within its
present borders. The ideological conflict between capitalism and communism was fought
in many places around the world in the ten years after the end of World War II through
direct military action, most notably in Eastern Europe, China, and the Korean Peninsula.
For places like Guatemala, though, President Eisenhower preferred the use of covert
operations instead of conventional military action. 2 The Central Intelligence Agency,
began in 1947 under President Harry Truman, launched its campaign against Arbenz late
in 1953 after receiving approval from CIA Director Allen Dulles and the president.
Over the last 58 years, scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the
events in Guatemala in 1953 and 1954. Many have sought to clarify who was to blame
for the coup.3 Put another way, the “blame” game has been “beaten to death” after more
than fifty years of writing on the subject. Clearly, there is no single answer regarding
who or what caused the United States to end its Good Neighbor Policy and execute a
heavy-handed clandestine operation in a small Central American country. Simply put,
perhaps, all actors involved are partially to blame for this intervention. Nonetheless,
there is substance to the fact that there is still much to learn from the event if one were to
cast aside the tendency of past researchers that placed blame on Jacobo Arbenz, the CIA,
Eisenhower‟s administration, or the United Fruit Company. It is with that premise that
the scope of this research was undertaken.
Examination of hundreds of pages of CIA documents released in 2003 under the
Agency‟s Historical Review Program reveal that the covert operation known as
PBSUCCESS could not have achieved its goals of removing Jacobo Arbenz from power

2
3

John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006) 148.
An assessment of the literature on Operation PBSUCCESS will be covered in the first chapter.
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if not for psychological intelligence. This intelligence, gathered through multiple
sources, was aimed at developing a propaganda campaign to cause unrest in the days and
weeks leading up to the “invasion” by a small group of Guatemalan exiles led by Castillo
Armas. This thesis combines political, economic, cultural, religious, and technological
history of the United States and Latin America to explain how the CIA‟s background
research on the people of Guatemala proved to be an integral part of the overall success
of the operation. Although the psychological warfare campaign launched by the CIA (fed
mainly by a clandestine radio program known as SHERWOOD) has received nominal
attention by scholars, little is known about the intelligence gathered to cause the
Guatemalan people to tune in and listen to the propaganda radio broadcasts and the
politically-charged homilies given by Guatemalan priests in the weeks leading up to
Arbenz‟s overthrow.
The organization of this research project is divided into four chapters. The first
chapter scrutinizes earlier research on Operation PBSUCCESS and reviews the
scholarship that developed over the last 58 years. Chapter 2 analyzes the CIA‟s efforts to
gather psychological intelligence and pick out a site to broadcast its clandestine radio
broadcasts. This chapter will also highlight many of the political arguments that were
broadcast by the CIA and the Guatemalan government‟s challenges through its own
propaganda. Chapters 3 and 4 go into greater detail on how this intelligence was utilized
to destabilize the country through efforts of the Roman Catholic Church and
entertainment programs broadcast on Radio Liberación, the CIA‟s covert radio station
launched on May 1, 1954. Primary sources used for this study include diplomatic
correspondence contained in the Foreign Relations of the United States series (published

ix

by the Government Printing Office in Washington DC), hundreds of pages of documents
released by the CIA in 2003, as well as previous research conducted by CIA historians,
experts on Guatemalan history, and historians specializing in Latin American religious
history.

Background
As the United States increased its economic and political power in the late 1800s
and early 1900s, the nations of Latin America experienced greater economic and military
pressures from the “hovering giant” to its north. As a result of political instability in
many parts of the region, the United States often sent its marines and naval ships to Latin
American countries in an effort to maintain its economic security. In Guatemala, the
United States did not intervene militarily. Prior to the election of Juan Arévalo in 1944,
the United States was able to penetrate the country through private investment due to the
many corrupt dictators who controlled Guatemala during the late 1800s and early 1900s.
United Fruit Company amassed a great deal of economic control over the country. This
Boston-based company controlled the only Atlantic port in Puerto Barrios, owned nearly
all of the railroads within the country through its subsidiary International Railways of
Central America (IRCA), and was the largest landowner and employer in Guatemala. 4
At the onset of the Great Depression, Guatemala‟s economic instability caused a
great deal of political and social upheaval. To restore order and encourage economic

4

The United Fruit Company held approximately 550,000 acres on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts by the
time of Jacobo Arbenz‟s agrarian reform act in the summer of 1952. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen
Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2005) 75.

x

growth, the nation‟s elite united to form a more stable government under Jorge Ubico. 5
Under Ubico, Guatemala‟s economy stabilized and the nation‟s relationship with the
United States remained amicable. 6 However, during the Great Depression, many
Guatemalan middle and working class people read about American President Franklin
Roosevelt‟s Four Freedoms and began to demand social reforms and democracy in their
country as well. By 1944, the Guatemalan people grew tired of their dictator and,
spawned by the impending victory over European dictators Adolf Hitler and Benito
Mussolini, they demanded change. 7
On July 1, 1944, due to growing pressures from within the country, developments
in Mexico, and the loss of American support for President Ubico, due to his “erratic and
unreliable” behavior, the domineering leader of Guatemala resigned. 8 Later, after months
of unrest and anti-government propaganda following Ubico‟s resignation, free elections
took place and Juan José Arévalo was chosen as president. Between 1945 and 1950,
Arévalo‟s administration had four priorities: agrarian reform, better rights for workers, a

5

United States Department of State, Susan K. Holly and David S. Patterson, eds., Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1952-1954: Guatemala (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
2003) xxiii (Hereafter noted as FRUS: Guatemala). The majority of Guatemalan elites in the early
twentieth century were coffee growers and controlled 72 percent of the Guatemalan land despite
comprising only two percent of the country‟s total population.
6
After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, Ubico declared war on all of the Axis Powers
and subsequently moved to assist the FBI in deporting German citizens and Guatemalans of German origin
to the United States. In 1944, Ubico‟s government expropriated all of the coffee estates belonging to
Germans. See Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 19441954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991) 19-21.
7
Even elites that benefitted from Ubico‟s rule turned against him. Similar cases were found throughout the
circum-Caribbean as Anastacio Somoza (Nicaragua), Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic), Fulgencio
Batista (Cuba), and Isaias Medina Angarita (Venezuela) all either had their control seriously threatened or
were removed from power. See FRUS, Guatemala, xxiv; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 22.
8
See John J. Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute: The Expropriation of American-Owned Rural Land in
Postrevolutionary Mexico (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008) for information on Lazaro
Cardenas‟ diplomatic tactics which challenged U.S. hegemony in the 1930s. Franklin Roosevelt
subsequently accommodated Cardenas in his reform efforts.
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stronger educational system, and a consolidation of Guatemala‟s political democracy. 9
During his term, Arévalo was an outspoken advocate for the peasantry. He began a series
of reforms aimed at curbing the economic stranglehold that United Fruit had on the
country. His successor, Jacobo Arbenz, elected in 1950, expanded Arévalo‟s reforms and
completely upended the oligarchical system that had existed since the colonial era.
After Jacobo Arbenz took power in 1951, the United States government became
very concerned about the activities of communists in Guatemala and the levels to which
Arbenz‟s government supported them. The economic and agricultural reforms that he
instituted negatively affected the United Fruit Company. Beginning in 1953, the Arbenz
government expropriated nearly 400,000 of the 550,000 acres of land that UFCO owned
in Guatemala in an act of legislation known as Decree 900.10 Of the approximately
550,000 acres of land that the company controlled, 85 percent of it was unused; “only as
many bananas were grown as could be sold abroad.” UFCO contended that the reason
for leaving the majority of its land uncultivated was due to the periodic infestations of
plant diseases that could wipe out its crops.11 The United Fruit Company owned more
land in Guatemala than any other organization and controlled a majority share of the
country‟s only railroad. As compensation for the expropriation of the lands taken from
UFCO, the Guatemalan government offered the company “twenty-five-year term bonds

9

Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005) 26-37. This is the revised and expanded edition of this
seminal work. The original work, entitled Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in
Guatemala, was published in 1982 and distributed by Doubleday. Reprints appeared in 1983 and 1990.
All subsequent citations in this essay will utilize the most recent edition of Schlesinger and Kinzer‟s work.
10
Zachary Karabell, Architects of Intervention: the United States, the Third World, and the Cold War,
1946-1962 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1999) 103, 105. Decree 900 was a
landmark reform project passed in June 1952; it enabled Arbenz‟s government to advance the agrarian
reform first proposed by Arévalo. This law stated “uncultivated lands on estates greater than 224 acres
[were] subject to expropriation.”
11
Schlesinger and Kinzer 75-76.
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at 3-percent guaranteed interest for the exact book value of the assets claimed by United
Fruit”, but UFCO immediately rejected this proposal due to what it believed to be a gross
under-compensation. For much of the early 1900s, UFCO undervalued its properties in
Latin America to decrease the amount of tax liabilities it had on its lands. Adding to the
impression that UFCO was being targeted by Arbenz‟s government, Guatemala offered a
total of $627,572 as compensation for the expropriated lands when UFCO (and later the
State Department in April 1954) demanded a much more significant amount,
$15,854,849.12 The agrarian reform did not affect the large Guatemalan landowners as
greatly as it did the Boston-based company. After Arbenz expropriated nearly eighty
percent of UFCO lands, Guatemalans who owned large tracts of land were treated with
moderation by the Arbenz government. Provided that the lands owned were under
production, these tracts were left out of expropriation.13 Decree 900 proved to be the
major tipping point in the American decision to overthrow Arbenz.
American foreign policy in developing nations during the Cold War combined the
economic, political, and national security goals of the country. When foreign
governments nationalized assets controlled by foreign investors, the United States
justified intervention by stating that this action by foreign governments was a trend
toward communism. 14 President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles both believed that communist incursions into areas of the developing world hinged
upon economic nationalists rebelling against the established political and economic order.

12

John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through
the Persian Gulf (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1996), 98. See also Schlesinger and Kinzer 76.
13
Robert Wasserstrom, “Revolution in Guatemala: Peasants and Politics under the Arbenz Government,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History 17, no. 4 (October 1975) 445-455.
14
The United States intervened in Iran shortly before the hostilities occurred in Guatemala and intervened
in Cuba seven years afterward due to the nationalization of foreign assets.
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In a speech delivered to the Congress of Industrial Organizations in Cleveland, Ohio in
November 1953, Dulles stated the goals of American foreign policy in the face of
communist threats. He mistakenly believed that the Soviet Union‟s policy on world
revolution focused on nationalist aspirations of “colonial peoples” and instigated them to
rebel. Before the newly won independence could “become consolidated and vigorous in
its own right,” the communists would, according to Dulles, move in and absorb the
people into their “orbit”.15 Because of this speech, many American diplomats believed
that nationalist movements such as those that occurred in Guatemala were the first steps
toward the establishment of a communist country in the Western Hemisphere. The
speech itself was misleading, however, because it did not accurately depict events in
Guatemala. Arévalo and Arbenz came to power through peaceful democratic elections
and the economic and social reforms were carried out peacefully. The violence that
Dulles spoke of in his speech did not occur until after Arbenz resigned and the country
plunged into a bloody forty-year civil war.
As Arbenz enacted economic reforms that aided the Guatemalan working class,
the United States increased its efforts to depose him. The more even-handed Good
Neighbor Policy instituted in the 1930s by Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt was
no longer advanced by American foreign policymakers in the post-WWII era.16 For the
United States, safeguarding political and economic interests in the Western Hemisphere

15

John Foster Dulles, “The Moral Initiative,” John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 75, Mudd Library, Princeton
University cited in Zachary Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 111-112. Eisenhower wrote a
memorandum to Dulles stating that he agreed with these principles. See Louis Galambos et al, eds., The
Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency, The Middle Way, Vol. XIV (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996), 676-677.
16
In the early 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt pledged not to interfere with Latin American affairs in an effort to
develop cooperation between the United States and Latin America. This policy instituted a new era in
inter-American relations. It ended the heavy-handed policy of the United States toward Latin America
from 1898-1934 that was characterized by many military interventions.
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was paramount to hemispheric policy; even if it meant renouncing the claims that
Washington would no longer meddle with the internal affairs of the nations south of the
Rio Grande. By 1952, Harry Truman tasked the CIA to develop plans to remove Arbenz
from power in Guatemala. When the United States State Department hosted Nicaraguan
president Anastacio Somoza in April 1952, discussions ensued on how to “take care of”
Arbenz. With proper support from the United States, Somoza insisted that he, along with
exiled Guatemalan Colonel Castillo Armas, could successfully lead an uprising to
overthrow the Guatemalan government.17 Known as Operation PBFORTUNE, the goal
of the United States was to support the operation covertly by providing a limited amount
of material and logistical support to an armed insurrection by Castillo Armas so as not to
reveal the relinquishment of the Good Neighbor Policy. The U.S. successfully utilized
the Good Neighbor Policy in the late 1940s to create the Organization of American States
(OAS) and establish Pan-Americanism for the defense of the hemisphere against external
threats like communism. When Somoza exposed the CIA‟s role in this operation, the
strategic efforts of twenty years of American foreign policy were threatened. As a result,
the U.S. arms shipments authorized to send to Castillo Armas were stopped and the
operation was put on hold. 18 Covert efforts in Guatemala by the CIA increased when
Dwight Eisenhower became President in 1953, however. Soon after Eisenhower became
president, the CIA began moving forward with its efforts to remove Arbenz from power,

17

Castillo Armas lived in exile after being captured during a failed attempt in 1951 to instigate the
Guatemalan army to rebel against the newly-elected Arbenz. Armas had been a strong supporter of
Francisco Arana, the chief political opponent of Arbenz. Arana was assassinated in 1949. See Gleijeses
81-83.
18
Nicholas Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 19521954 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999) 28-31. Somoza stated “„[j]ust give me the arms, and
I‟ll clean up Guatemala for you in no time‟” to President Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and
other U.S. officials. See Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United
States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991) 229.
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an operation later known as PBSUCCESS. To accomplish this, it took an expansive
psychological warfare campaign to convince the majority of Guatemalans (sixty percent
of the population) to support a movement to overthrow their president.

xvi

Chapter 1
“Leaving No Stone Unturned”
The Development of Historiography on PBSUCCESS
For forty-five years following the conclusion of World War II, the United States
exerted its influence in many of the developing regions of the world in order to curb the
spread of communist and nationalist ideologies. Latin America was a crucial theater in
which the United States asserted its political and economic policy in order to circumvent
leftist governments that threatened American political and business interests. With the
elections of Juan Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala (in 1944 and 1950
respectively), American hegemony in Central America, which went nearly unchecked for
the first half of the twentieth century, was jeopardized. The United States moved toward
intervention and implemented a covert operation known as PBSUCCESS that forced the
democratically elected Arbenz to resign from the Guatemalan presidency. This ultimately
resulted in the installation of a U.S. hand-picked dictator, Castillo Armas, by the end of
the summer of 1954.
Scholarly interpretations of American intervention in Guatemala have varied over
time. Current events and availability of primary source material played pivotal roles in
the development of historians‟ understanding of the coup. Stephen Streeter outlined the
schools of thought on Cold War U.S. foreign policy in Latin America in an article he
wrote for The History Teacher in 2000. According to Streeter, realist (i.e. traditionalist)
scholars of the 1950s and 1960s generally blamed the Soviet Union‟s expansionist
ideologies for the rise of left-of-center governments in Latin America. Realists believed
that American intervention was necessary to rollback communism and remove leaders
1

like Jacobo Arbenz for being “Soviet puppets.” Even while events were still unfolding in
Guatemala in 1954, writers were offering conjectures on the necessity for the United
States to halt the progression of what many believed to be the prelude to communist
takeover in Central America. Due to the negative impact of the Vietnam War, starting in
the late 1960s, revisionist scholars began to blame the United States for their intervention
because it wished to expand its overseas markets through its foreign assets. This
paradigm was revised over the course of the next two decades with the revelation of new
source material and the advancement of economic theories such as dependency theory.
As revisionism ran its course by the early 1980s, newly released primary source material
from State Department archives and documents obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) that provided scholars with the ability to challenge the theories
put forth by revisionist historians. These post-revisionists, although tricky to accurately
characterize, incorporated both strategic and economic factors into their analysis. 19
Scholars since the mid 1950s have taken into account new revelations on the affairs in
Guatemala and have offered new interpretations over time, educating the field of history
on U.S. Cold War policy toward its southern neighbors.

Realist Scholars of the 1950s
Realists looked at the Cold War and warned of a bleak future if the United States
did not play an active role in containing communist threats from the two major
communist powers, the USSR and China. Daniel James summed up the feelings of these
scholars in the mid-1950s in his book, Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan

19

Stephen M. Streeter, “Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and
Postrevisionist Perspectives,” History Teacher 34 (November 2000) 62.

2

Prelude. “We enter upon a new era in our history. We face…the prospect of continuous
struggle against Communism on a hemispheric scale. We face the possibility even of
war–war on our own shores of the kind hitherto characteristic of Asia. Such is the
meaning of Moscow‟s first attempt to conquer an American country, Guatemala.” 20 The
scholars of the 1950s, much like the majority of Americans of the time, were greatly
influenced by the Red Scare earlier in the decade, when suspected communist activities in
the United States prompted multiple Congressional investigations of high-profile
officials. Around the same time, the threat of communist takeover was experienced in
various developing countries such as Iran, China, Vietnam, parts of Latin America, and
Korea. The propaganda produced by the orchestrators of Operation PBSUCCESS also
played a crucial role in influencing the interpretations of the traditional scholars writing
about the intervention.21 Without other source material to rely on aside from the
propaganda put forth by the architects of the intervention and various journalists‟
observations, realist scholars came to the conclusion that Soviet influence in Guatemala
was the primary reason for U.S. action in 1954.
Daniel James in 1954 outlined what he believed were communist activities in
Guatemala that threatened the entire region. He noted the presence of Guatemalan
consuls on the Honduran border in 1954 shortly before a general strike occurred with
Honduras. James quoted Secretary of State Dulles who had a presumption that a labor
work stoppage in Honduras occurred in the region where the Guatemalan government

20

Daniel James, Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude (New York: The John Day Company,
1954) 11.
21
See Stephen Streeter‟s remarks on the roots of the realist interpretation in “Interpreting the 1954
Intervention in Guatemala,” 62-63. For information on the Red Scare in America and the spread of
communism around the globe, see Martin Walker, The Cold War: A History (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, LLC, 1993) 59-82.

3

placed its consuls and noted that two of these consuls “were found to be deeply involved
in the strike.”22 Another scholar, Frederick B. Pike, wrote in 1955 that the Guatemalan
Communist Party, organized in 1947, changed its name to the Partido Guatemalteco de
Trabajo or Guatemalan Workers‟ Party in 1952. By doing this, the party received full
political rights within the country and quickly succeeded in infiltrating Guatemala‟s labor
organizations. Using the land reform law instituted in 1952 by Jacobo Arbenz, this party
seized control of the labor movement in the countryside.23 Realist scholars like James
and Pike viewed the actions by labor parties in Central America as being controlled by or,
at the very least, highly influenced by communists. What these scholars failed to take
into account was the mistreatment of workers in this region by American-owned
businesses during the first half of the twentieth century. When working classes in
Guatemala stood against this exploitation and promoted their own economic interests, it
was seen as hostile by American economic and diplomatic groups. This era in which
these scholars wrote was witness to confrontations between capitalism and Marxism
around the globe and, as a result, the only explanation for this change in Guatemala for
realists was an aggressive communist influence. According to realist scholars, American
intervention in Guatemala in 1954 occurred in response to Soviet intervention, which was
a direct violation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine.
Other realist scholars of the 1950s attributed U.S. policy to preventing communist
takeover as well, but they also added different explanations to the roots of communist
activity in Guatemala. In an article published in 1954 for the International Journal,
William Krehm outlined the Guatemalan support for democratic movements throughout
22

Daniel James, Red Design for the Americas, 195-196
Frederick B. Pike, “Guatemala, the United States, and Communism in the Americas,” The Review of
Politics 17, no. 2 (April 1955) 242-243
23

4

the circum-Caribbean against military dictatorships supported by the United States. He
argued that in retaliation for the support Guatemala gave to the Caribbean Legion, the
United States placed an arms embargo on the country. 24 Krehm attributed the nationalist
tendencies of Guatemala under Arévalo, and the actions taken by the Caribbean Legion to
communism, rather than revolutionaries attempting to thwart U.S.-backed dictatorships in
the region. This was a similar tendency for realist scholars when writing on nationalism
in Latin America.
Many of the realist scholars of the 1950s argued that America acted upon a
potential communist threat to the Western Hemisphere in order to prevent communism
from spreading to other Latin American nations. Influenced by the Truman Doctrine of
1947 which worked to actively contain the spread of communism by not openly engaging
in armed conflict with the Soviet Union, realists interpreted the economic nationalism of
Guatemala similar to the American policymakers. According to Daniel James, the
agrarian reforms signed into law by Arbenz in 1952 facilitated an offensive by
communists to take their “war of attrition” out of the Guatemalan capital and attack
Guatemalan and American investments in the countryside. 25 Other realists in the mid1950s made a case that communist influence in Guatemala began to grow in the 1940s
under Arévalo. In 1956, John D. Martz argued that Arévalo was not opposed to
communism and did little to curb the communists‟ growing power during his presidency.
He advanced his argument further by stating that Arbenz, although not a communist,
aided them by not uprooting the party when he had a chance in 1951. 26

24

William Krehm, “A Victory for the West in Guatemala?,” International Journal 9, no. 4 (Autumn, 1954)
298. For a precise definition of the Caribbean Legion see Gleijeses, 107-116.
25
Daniel James, Red Design for the Americas, 123.
26
John D. Martz, Communist Infiltration in Guatemala (New York: Vintage Press, 1956) 47.

5

The anti-communist feeling in America inspired the realist scholars‟ arguments of
the 1950s and influenced their choice of sources. The sources made available to realist
scholars by the late 1950s helped to build a case for the necessity of American
intervention abroad to prevent the spread of communism. Ronald M. Schneider utilized a
General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers‟ public document to show the remorse
felt by Guatemalan labor unions when Soviet leader Joseph Stalin died in 1953. 27 By
showing the sadness felt by the Guatemalan working class, Schneider attempted to reveal
the connections between communism and Guatemalan workers, thus justifying American
intervention there. Schneider was a bit more objective in his analysis of Operation
PBSUCCESS though; accurately noting in his epilogue that the laboring classes of
Guatemala for the first time in the country‟s history had the ability to “freely organize,
bargain collectively, and strike.” 28 This opened the door for later revisionist scholars to
take a much closer look at the social and economic factors involved and critique the
United States not just for its intervention but also for its contribution to a decades-long
exploitation of the Guatemalan peasantry and working class.

The Development of Revisionist Interpretations, 1960s and early-1970s
While realists of the 1950s focused on the power politics of the Cold War, by the
late 1960s scholars began to strongly question their interpretations. Escalation of
tensions in Vietnam brought criticisms against the government by much of America‟s
youth and from left-of-center scholars working in its universities. Historians in this era
began to critique the United States‟ foreign policy in the developing world. For many of
27
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these revisionists, the United States intervened to protect its economic interests and
maintain its “informal empire.” Some wrote that the intervention in Guatemala in 1954
served as a precedent for U.S. Cold War foreign policy that justified intervention
wherever its interests were threatened.29 D.F. Fleming argued in 1966 that because the
United States helped so many of the world‟s trouble spots, it dangerously weakened its
economy, neglected its poor, and in attempting to curb communism, it helped to promote
right-wing dictatorships around the world. 30 These beliefs caused many revisionists to
rethink American foreign policy during the Cold War. These revisionists were far more
critical of U.S. actions than the realists and began to critique U.S. domestic policies and
private interests in their analysis of Washington‟s Latin American policy.
Helped by new sources, such as Congressional testimony given in the 1960s by
many of the key American actors in the 1954 intervention, revisionist scholars proposed
novel interpretations on how much of a role the United States played in the overthrow of
Arbenz. In 1971, Max Gordon argued that prior to the 1944 revolution that brought
Arévalo to power, American-owned corporations monopolized Guatemala‟s key
economic regions, relegated the nation‟s workforce to dependency status, stagnated the
growth of Guatemala‟s economy, and provided political backing to oppressive regimes
that perpetuated an impoverished society. 31 After the elections of Arévalo and Arbenz,
when hundreds of thousands of acres of land owned by UFCO were expropriated, the
United States began to move toward a counterrevolution. Gordon revealed that months
29
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after the inauguration of Eisenhower as president, Spruille Braden, an ex-assistant
secretary of state for Latin America, promoted American intervention in Guatemala to the
administration. Ironically, Braden worked as a public relations director for UFCO in
1953 and issued a follow-up statement to a speech he gave at Dartmouth College
attacking Guatemala‟s agrarian reform law.32 The connections drawn by historians
between politicians and consultants for the UFCO proved to be a major turning point in
the scholarship on the 1954 intervention. It provided later revisionist historians with a
crucial argument by which to base their critiques of American involvement in Operation
PBSUCCESS.
Studies conducted in the 1970s by social scientists began to delve deeply into the
economic causes of the 1954 counterrevolution. In a study published in 1975, Robert
Wasserstrom examined the influence that UFCO played in everyday Guatemalan life. In
an attempt to debunk theories that posited that remote communities of indigenous people
carried on a sense of economic backwardness in Guatemala (and elsewhere in Latin
America), Wasserstrom studied the efforts made by Presidents Arévalo and Arbenz to
assimilate indigenous communities into the Guatemalan political economy. 33 The
arguments made by Wasserstrom revealed that Arbenz favored economic nationalism.
That Arbenz treated Guatemalan fincas modestly under his agrarian reform compared to
the foreign agribusinesses such as UFCO is reflected in much of the revisionist
32
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scholarship that downplayed the role of communism as the primary reason for American
intervention in 1954.

The “Peak” of the Revisionist School of Thought, late-1970s and early-1980s
By the 1970s, economic theories were influencing much of the scholarship on
U.S. foreign affairs, Guatemala being no exception. The Dependency Theory (and later
World Systems Theory) became the foundation for much of the analysis conducted on
Operation PBSUCCESS in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Author José Aybar de Soto
examined many of the elements of U.S. involvement in Guatemala and placed the
intervention into the context of the Dependency Theory. Aybar de Soto examined
UFCO‟s role in the overthrow of Arbenz and argued that there was an “interlocking
nature between public and private sectors” which allowed the company to influence
American policymakers.34 He argued that the United States was a “core” nation in
relation to a “periphery” state of Guatemala in the world economy. The arguments made
by revisionists in the 1970s of the interdependence of private companies to public policy
in the United States reflected the greater emphasis placed upon economics as the primary
influence on American Cold War foreign policy.
In 1982, Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer wrote Bitter Fruit that advanced
Aybar de Soto‟s interpretation of the 1954 American-led coup in Guatemala. These
authors offered the clearest exposition of the revisionist position to date and synthesized
the works of earlier revisionist historians. Utilizing State Department communications,
these authors revealed that Secretary of State Dulles authorized the American ambassador
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to Guatemala, John Peurifoy, to ensure that Castillo Armas, the Guatemalan president
who took control of Guatemala soon after the coup, offered the United Fruit Company a
generous contract.35 The Dependency Theory and attention to economic forces shaping
U.S. policy led writers to look at the connections between private business interests and
public policy. It also led to many interpretations placing the blame for U.S. intervention
on its economic objectives.
The groundbreaking work of Schlesinger and Kinzer utilized previously
unreleased documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). It
proved to be a startling revelation of the connection that existed between U.S. economic
interests and foreign policy. These authors debunked realist theories of the 1950s.
Schlesinger and Kinzer revealed that the arguments that the Soviet Union was attempting
to establish a base in Guatemala did not have merit. Guatemala had no diplomatic
connections to the USSR or any other nation in the Soviet bloc with the exception of
Czechoslovakia. The authors provided a long list of ties that Eisenhower Administration
officials had with UFCO, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother,
CIA Director Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors
Cabot, UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and Undersecretary of State Bedell Smith
whom Schlesinger and Kinzer revealed to be “seeking an executive job with United Fruit
while helping to plan the coup against Guatemala”.36 For many scholars of the previous
generation studying Operation PBSUCCESS, this information was not available when

35

Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 218
Ibid. 106-107. See also Jonathon L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson, and Nancy
Peckenham, eds., Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History (New York: Grove Press, 1983) 69. The
authors, in a post script to Max Gordon‟s 1971 article entitled “A Case History of U.S. Subversion”,
remarked that the inspiration for the 1944 revolution in Guatemala came from Franklin Roosevelt‟s New
Deal, not the Soviet Union, as many realist scholars of the 1950s argued.
36

10

their works were published. The publication of Bitter Fruit in 1982 was the apex of
revisionist scholarship because it utilized previously unexplored primary source material
to provide a lucid clarification on the connection between the economic interests of
policymakers and the covert operation that deposed a democratically-elected president in
a sovereign nation.

Post-Revisionism, 1980s-Present
The post-revisionist school of thought on American foreign policy in Latin
America began to take shape around the same time revisionist interpretations were
reaching their height in popularity in the early 1980s. Post-revisionists incorporated
many of the economic paradigms that revisionists propagated, but these scholars placed a
much greater emphasis on ideological and cultural aspects for U.S. intervention in Latin
America. 37 This school of thought is much more difficult to accurately define when
applying it to the 1954 coup in Guatemala due to the many topics that were (and still are)
explored by these scholars. In 1982, Richard Immerman challenged Schlesinger and
Kinzer‟s theory that the coup was ordered to promote the economic interests of the
United States. Immerman argued that although United Fruit Company‟s interests were
harmed by the efforts of the Arbenz government to expropriate land to peasants, the
company still retained 150,000 acres of land in Guatemala. He also argued that the
Eisenhower administration confused the terms nationalist and communist when referring
to Arbenz.38 This interpretation reexamined some of the elements of realist
interpretations of earlier historians. It focused on the economic motivation for the coup
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but also provided a domestic political argument of Eisenhower‟s anticommunist foreign
policy. Immerman showed that both political and economic forces shaped the
intervention in 1954 and this helped to usher in the post-revisionist school of thought to
the field of study on Operation PBSUCCESS.
The early 1980s were a period of transition for scholarship on the 1954 U.S.
intervention in Guatemala. As new source material became uncovered, new studies
began to explore previously unexamined elements of the coup. In 1983, Gordon Bowen
argued that both American and Guatemalan actors played pivotal roles in bringing about
the 1954 coup; at times, working symbiotically. Bowen noted that even though UFCO
lost the most land under Arbenz‟s agrarian reform, Guatemalan military officers with ties
to banana and coffee plantations lost many acres of land prior to Decree 900 being
enacted in 1952. Anti-government violence increased significantly between 1951 and
1953 during a time where the United States pledged much less support to the efforts to
overthrow Arbenz. Looking at Guatemalan politics, Bowen cited U.S. Ambassador John
Peurifoy‟s reaction to the seizure of UFCO lands. Peurifoy, handpicked by the
Eisenhower Administration to oversee the covert operations in Guatemala, quickly
changed the subject to communists in the Arbenz government at his first meeting with the
Guatemalan president. Bowen argued that although communists were small in number in
the Arbenz government, they did exist and Arbenz knew that they were there. Combining
secondary literature with declassified State Department and CIA documents, Bowen
came to the conclusion that “the communists were too successful at democratic politics to
allow democracy to survive.” 39 In other words, the small number of communists in the
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Guatemalan government used the social democratic government to their advantage,
playing upon the social revolution that began in 1944.
Some scholars by the late 1980s began to examine new areas of study to prove
their arguments that the primary reason for U.S. intervention in Latin America was
economics. Gabriel Kolko in 1988 examined U.S. hegemony in Latin America in the late
1940s and 1950s. Kolko argued in his book, Confronting the Third World: United States
Foreign Policy, 1945-1980, that the United States is “preeminently an economic
civilization” and that this premise was deeply rooted in the policy of the United States.
In this work Kolko established the idea that America promoted capitalism in such a way
that its business interests were implemented.40 As a revisionist historian critical of U.S.
foreign policy, Kolko augmented many of the ideas put forth by scholars like Aybar de
Soto, Schlesinger, and Kinzer. Although the revisionist paradigm was still relevant by
the time this book was published, scholars by this point were beginning to focus more
attention on untapped sources which facilitated variant interpretative works by the end of
the decade.
In 1988, Jim Handy sought to show the effects of Decree 900 on Guatemalans.
He shifted away from the arguments of earlier scholars who considered the agrarian
reform to be a foreign policy issue concerning the expropriation of UFCO lands. Handy,
instead, consulted Guatemalan source material to reveal the various forces that led to
Decree 900, the domestic support and opposition to the program, and the manner by
which the law was applied in the country. By drawing upon the archival records from
Guatemala as they pertained to Decree 900, Handy illustrated that the movement assisted
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the development of large working class organizations that were crucial to the law‟s
implementation. According to Handy, when Arbenz was elected president in 1950, twothirds of the population relied on agriculture as their source of income. For many
decades, “land dispossession had helped bind the majority of the population into depths
of poverty.” Handy summarized the history of land allocation in the country from the
time of Spanish colonial rule to the days leading up to the revolution of 1944. He
mentioned that land expropriation from the indigenous population did not reach a
wholesale level until commercial cultivation of coffee became widespread in the late
1800s and by 1944, more than half of the farming units, some 165,850 families, owned
less than what was required for subsistence. Handy argued that Guatemalan politicians
during the revolutionary period placed agrarian reform above all other legislation.
Reform under Arévalo was done with care due to resistance by leaders of the armed
forces. The Arévalo government withstood more than thirty coup attempts during his
presidency. Arbenz, however, promised agrarian reform in his campaign speeches and
delivered on his promise in May 1952. Handy outlined the revisions that the original bill
underwent as it went through the Guatemalan legislature and also listed the “hierarchical
series of organizations” that Decree 900 established within the country. 41 Handy
contributed a very important addition to the historiography on Guatemala by studying
land reform in Guatemala and the effects that it had on both large Guatemalan
landowners and peasants.
Jim Handy provided a follow-up study to his research on agrarian reform in 1989
with a study of the complex differences among the Guatemalan population. Handy noted
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that much of the agricultural production was provided by the labor of indigenous people.
When coffee production began to increase substantially by the late 1800s, Guatemalan
Indians were, at times, forced into laboring on the coffee plantations. In the years leading
up to the 1944 revolution, many belittling myths developed among the non-indigenous
population of Guatemala about culture in the countryside. Handy stated that some within
the country advocated wiping out Indian culture altogether in order to “solve” this
problem. 42 Handy noted that during the revolutionary period, the Ladino population in
rural Guatemala became increasingly alarmed when indigenous groups congregated in
large numbers outside of the small towns. This hysteria often resulted in army
interventions to prevent mass uprisings. Adding to the fear of a mass Indian revolt was a
book published in Guatemala in 1946 detailing the events of la matanza in El Salvador in
the 1930s. The book contained ghastly photographs of the destruction to both lives and
property. Handy noted that the link between communism and Indian revolt, as seen in El
Salvador with la matanza played a major role in the hysteria of the people living in the
Guatemalan countryside. 43 This article provided a background for why the agrarian
reforms instituted by Arbenz led to unrest in the rural regions of Guatemala. This fear of
unrest prompted Ladino elites in the countryside to call upon the army to quell the
relatively minor disturbances that occurred between Ladinos and indigenous groups
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between 1944 and 1952. To this end, Handy concluded that this fear was as much a part
of the overthrow of Arbenz in 1954 as any other element posited by previous scholars. 44
In the early 1990s, historians continued to expand upon the earlier works of
revisionist and post-revisionist scholars by examining many other new elements to
explain American intervention in Latin America. Like Jim Handy in the late 1980s, Piero
Gleijeses studied the 1954 America-led coup in Guatemala by utilizing Guatemalan
sources. He wrote an article for The Journal of Latin American Studies in 1990 that
provided an alternative view on the Guatemalan revolution that began in 1944. Gleijeses
argued that a turning point in the revolution occurred in 1949 with the assassination of
the Chief of the Armed Forces, Francisco Arana. The conservative colonel aspired to
become the next president of Guatemala in 1950. With his death, it helped to allow
Jacobo Arbenz to ascend to this role the following year. According to Gleijeses, the
actors responsible for the death of Arana are enveloped in controversy. Some scholars
speculated that members of the Guatemalan upper class were responsible for his death
due to his hesitancy to launch a coup against Arévalo. Gleijeses riposted this assertion by
stating that it defied logic because Arana was the only man capable of gaining the
presidency who supported the elites in the country. Arana opposed Arévalo but did not
wish to take the presidency through extralegal means. Gleijeses conducted convincing
research that the death of Arana came as a result of his personal ambitions as a plotter.
He did not wish to take over the presidency but invited his own murder by physically
threatening Arévalo days before his assassination. As a result, Jacobo Arbenz ascended
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to the presidency the following year and set in motion the events that lead to the
counterrevolution in 1954. 45 The article written by Piero Gleijeses, along with the
articles written by Jim Handy are indirectly related to the 1954 counterrevolution.
However, they make up an integral part of the historiography on the event because each
helps explain the internal forces that shaped the events in 1954.
In 1991 Piero Gleijeses provided a great addition to the literature on the 1954
counterrevolution in Guatemala when he published Shattered Hope. By interviewing
numerous people living in Guatemala and ex-CIA officials over a twelve year period,
Gleijeses provided a detailed analysis of the relationship between the U.S. and Guatemala
from 1944-1954. He supplied a succinct political and economic analysis of the event.
Gleijeses quoted Jacobo Arbenz‟s closest friend as stating that the coup in 1954 would
have occurred even if Guatemala did not grow bananas. 46 This assertion suggested that
the United States did have an anti-communist motive for deposing Arbenz. He
acknowledged that there was some basis to the argument that Arbenz was a communist,
but the government was still headed by a presidential system. 47
By embarking on this enriching study, Gleijeses offered the most explicit
narrative of the combined economic and political factors involved in the Guatemalan
counterrevolution to the literature. He noted that despite the restrictions placed on
American companies dominating the Guatemalan economy, the leaders of Guatemala
during this decade were nationalists and sought to become an ally of the U.S. and not just
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a satellite. 48 Gleijeses showed through an exploration of American media articles that
when Decree 900 was enacted, it was received in the United States with much concern
that the communist party agenda was being played out by a weak executive in Arbenz. 49
His work helped to set the field of study on Guatemala in a new direction as the Cold
War ended. The convincing arguments conceived in Shattered Hope revealed that there
were political and economic motives for the intervention and that the two were
interconnected.
The early 1990s were a pivotal period for scholarship on Guatemala and many
other events related to the Cold War. As global tensions eased with the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991, so too did new archives open which allowed scholars to develop
new research on Operation PBSUCCESS. Earlier scholars wrote with limited empirical
evidence which often resulted in implications of blame placed on communists working
inside Guatemala or the United States‟ continuation of asserting hegemonic influence on
its neighbors to the south. As more archival sources became available, the field of study
expanded and a great deal of new interpretations came about. The post-revisionist
school, limited at first and often containing many of the same elements from revisionist
scholars, really took off in the 1990s beginning with Gleijeses‟ Shattered Hope. As the
decade wore on, new research provided the field with detailed analyses of the Central
Intelligence Agency‟s role in the coup along with updates to earlier economic analyses of
the coup.
In 1991, Susanne Jonas published a clear account of the 1954 counterrevolution
and subsequent civil war that engulfed the country. Conducting research in Guatemala
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for Jonas began in the 1960s when the country was in the midst of a civil war that lasted
until 1996. As she explained in her introduction to her 1991 publication, she became
entranced by the country. In the light of new developments in the country in the 1970s
and 1980s, she wrote a historical narrative on the country. 50 Jonas acknowledged the
earlier interpretations by revisionist historians that there was a link between the
Eisenhower Administration and the United Fruit Company. However, she also
questioned how strong the link was and whether it was the primary factor in prompting
the execution of Operation PBSUCCESS in 1954. According to Jonas, “[t]he U.S.
government and private U.S. investors became concerned over the increasing
radicalization of the Revolution under Arbenz” who increasingly allied itself with
members of the Guatemalan peasantry and working classes. 51 To that end, she helped to
advance the post-revisionist perspective that political and economic elements played
crucial roles in the toppling of the Arbenz government.
In 1994, Martha Cottam critiqued the U.S. government for oversimplifying
Jacobo Arbenz‟s government in Guatemala. Cottam argued that the Truman and
Eisenhower Administrations both saw the nationalist tendencies of Arbenz as hostile to
American economic interests and were likely influenced by communist activity in the
country.52 Other historians in the late 1990s made very good use of the declassified State
Department documents after the Cold War and came to similar conclusions about the
Eisenhower Administration. James F. Siekmeier examined the nationalism of Latin
American nations like Guatemala and Bolivia and argued that for American foreign
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policy makers, the economic nationalism of these nations posed a far-greater challenge
than communism. 53 Michael Krenn explored the interdependence between the United
States and Latin American countries. He argued that the United States realized during
the Cold War that it needed the developing nations of Latin America in order to expand
its markets, acquire raw materials, and gain strategic positions in global diplomacy with a
united Western Hemisphere. In turn, the Latin American nations received protection,
capital, and technology from the United States.54 These two authors utilized State
Department records to provide new interpretations about the U.S. Latin American policy.
By utilizing these records, Siekmeier and Krenn advanced the post-revisionist approach
by exploring the economic interdependence between the United States and Latin America
as a reason for American involvement.
In the 1990s, a major breakthrough for scholars studying the 1954 coup in
Guatemala occurred. In response to the former Soviet Union opening its archives to help
answer many questions about the mysteries of the Cold War behind the Iron Curtain, the
Central Intelligence Agency‟s Director in 1992, Robert Gates, “announced that all
documents over thirty years old would be reviewed for declassification.” 55 This allowed
many historians to research the role of the CIA in the execution of Operation
PBSUCCESS. Shortly after the Agency‟s announcement that it planned to “open up” its
archives and shed light on the secrets of its covert operations during the Cold War,
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Nicholas Cullather was hired to conduct research on Operation PBSUCCESS. Initially,
his findings were kept secret by the Agency to be distributed only among members of the
CIA. However, after President Bill Clinton issued an executive order in 1996 to
declassify and release hundreds of thousands of pages of material, and the Agency
requested that two-thirds of it remain secret, many complaints arose. As a result, the
Agency eventually released Cullather‟s study as part of an ongoing campaign to be less
secretive about Guatemala and other covert operations it conducted during the Cold
War. 56
Cullather‟s study, although still containing classified materials blacked out in
printed copies available to the public, was a very clear narrative of the CIA‟s role in
Operation PBSUCCESS. At the very least, it created opportunities for other scholars to
answer questions related to the operation that had previously not been explored.
Cullather addressed many of the critiques that the Agency miscalculated the communist
influence in the country and offered a rebuttal to these appraisals. Cullather‟s research on
the CIA documents revealed that officials in the United States viewed Guatemala as it did
other parts of the world that fell to communism. To those officials, if communism gained
a foothold in Guatemala, the chances of it spreading to other countries in the Western
Hemisphere increased significantly.
Cullather synthesized how the Agency viewed Arbenz‟s government in 1952. He
stated that many within the United States‟ foreign policy staff recognized that
communists only held a minor influence in the country at the time. However,
communists were slowly gaining influence. Plans to enforce diplomatic and economic
sanctions on Guatemala or UFCO abandoning its operations in the country would only
56
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work to strengthen the resolve of the communists in the country. The CIA recommended
that covert action be taken to remove Arbenz from power, a motion that the Pentagon
agreed with.57 Cullather detailed the Agency‟s progress in planning and carrying out the
operation but intentionally omitted documents related to the finances for the operation as
well as the SHERWOOD radio propaganda campaign that worked undermine the Arbenz
government. Cullather‟s study was a crucial addition to the literature on Operation
PBSUCCESS as it helped other scholars in the following years to continue researching
CIA operations in the country and answer many of the questions still remaining about its
role in the 1954 coup.
Scholars in the 2000s went into greater detail on the CIA operations during the
Cold War era. John Prados used declassified State Department and CIA documents to
write a lengthy book on the CIA‟s covert operations. Although his work was not specific
to the operations in Guatemala, he did reveal evidence that the CIA carried out a
convincing propaganda campaign against Arbenz‟s government. In April 1954, reports
surfaced that the president of Nicaragua, Anastacio Somoza, averted an assassination
attempt by the Caribbean Legion, a leftist group operating in the Caribbean which was
fighting against totalitarianism. According to Prados, the CIA worked strenuously to pin
a connection to Arbenz in an effort to undermine his government.58 Another scholar, Tim
Weiner, revealed that the CIA planted fake news stories in the Guatemalan media after
Colonel Al Haney‟s liaison to Castillo Armas, the CIA‟s choice to carry out the coup,
leaked that a plot was underway to depose Arbenz. 59 Weiner highlighted the imaginary
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uprisings broadcast by the CIA on its radio program in Guatemala and showed that the
effect of these broadcasts turned Jacobo Arbenz into the dictator that the CIA described
in earlier propaganda.60
Authors since the 1950s have revealed an immense amount of information about
the 1954 coup in Guatemala that overturned a decade-long reform effort attempting to
change the desolate fortunes of an overwhelming majority of Guatemala‟s population.
However, some questions remain unanswered. When Jacobo Arbenz resigned on June
27, 1954, he did so reluctantly and with the intention of not plunging his country into a
violent civil war that would upend all of the reforms he and his predecessor enacted.
What caused such a swift destabilization of his government? Surely, the undersized
armed forces under the command of Castillo Armas did not wield enough power to
successfully overthrow the government. As evidenced by Cullather‟s study, the CIA
embarked on a massive radio propaganda campaign that some scholars have attributed to
being the single-most crucial cause for the demise of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala.
U.S. scholars have written pieces (a paragraph to a few pages) on the CIA‟s propaganda,
its radio broadcasts known as SHERWOOD, and their effects, but little attention has been
given to precisely how the operation was carried out. More importantly, the question of
which methods were used to provoke the Guatemalan people to read the propaganda and
tune their shortwave radio dials to the CIA station and listen to the broadcasts remains
unanswered. This research project intends to broaden the understanding of this historical
problem. Evidence obtained through declassified State Department and CIA documents
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reveals that the Agency‟s biggest success in the entire operation was its ability to gain
psychological intelligence through various sources and formulate it into a very powerful
radio and religious propaganda campaign. People did not listen to the radio broadcasts to
hear political propaganda they could easily obtain from newspapers or various other
sources. Rather, they tuned into the station for its entertainment programs that contained
music and comedy selections. The intelligence gathered on the Guatemalan religious
background also proved crucial to the psychological warfare campaign as people heard
from priests and from the radio broadcasts that communism was an atheist ideology.
Less than two months after the station launched, these people, who first became hooked
by its music and entertainment programs, became convinced that a massive invasion led
by Castillo Armas was underway when in reality the invasion force was barely 1,500 and
the troops stopped after only traveling six miles into the country. 61 Hence, a conclusion
can be drawn that the psychological intelligence gathered by the CIA in the months
leading up to PBSUCCESS was the determining factor in the operation‟s triumph. The
following chapters will incorporate research undertaken on the SHERWOOD campaign
and the religious background of Guatemala to broaden our understanding of the 1954
coup in Guatemala.
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Chapter 2
“Overt Espionage”: Preparing Guatemala for Regime Change
In 1953, the CIA was tasked by President Eisenhower‟s administration to remove
Jacobo Arbenz‟s government, thought at the time to be dominated by communists, and
replacing it with a regime friendly to United States‟ interests. “This mission was to be
accomplished in such a manner as to retain all plausible denial of United States
participation.”62 Twenty years earlier, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt formally
expressed that it was not the intention of the United States to intervene in the affairs of its
neighbors in the Western Hemisphere, a course of action collectively known as the Good
Neighbor Policy. Actions against the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, whether overt or
clandestine, would indicate that the United States government abandoned its noninterventionist principles toward its neighbors south of the Rio Grande and reaffirmed the
imperialist tendencies of its foreign policy toward Latin America from 1898-1934.
By 1953, the United States perceived that there was a major security threat to the
Western Hemisphere if Arbenz remained in power. The most direct way to remove this
threat was an expansive propaganda campaign aimed at convincing a large segment of
the Guatemalan population that its government was overrun by communists. The
following graph indicates an assessment of the Guatemalan population made in April
1954 by two Guatemalan exiles hired by the CIA to carry out its radio propaganda
campaign.
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Analysis of the Guatemalan Population
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Source: David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1977) 40.

Two Guatemalan exiles, Mario López Otero and José Toron Barrios, accompanied David
Atlee Phillips, the man chosen by the CIA to oversee the SHERWOOD campaign, to
Guatemala in late April 1954 to prepare for the launch of Radio Liberación. The
assessment provided by Otero and Barrios was meant to determine the size of the target
audience for the radio broadcasts. The goal was to convince the overwhelming majority
of the population that allowing Arbenz to remain president would bring about a
communist takeover of the country.63

The CIA’s Preliminary Plans to Execute its Propaganda Program in Guatemala
For any operation to succeed, whether unconcealed or surreptitious, preparatory
work is crucial. For the Central Intelligence Agency in the months leading up to the
63
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execution of Operation PBSUCCESS, preparatory work meant the acquisition of
psychological intelligence or PI. In a report dated February 8, 1954 and circulated to the
operatives working toward implementing the psychological warfare program, the Agency
defined psychological intelligence as follows:
PI is a matter of “feel” solidly supported by facts. PI constitutes
deliberate, orderly examination of the attitudes in and toward a
given situation of both friendly and hostile individuals and social
groups. PI systematically analyzes the mind and mood of specific
individuals and specific social groups in specific sub-areas of the
target. Out of these specific observations, PI at regular intervals
makes a general appraisal of the entire target area‟s attitudes. 64
Prior to the circulation of this document within the Agency, psychological intelligence
gathering began as early as 1951 to determine which segments of the Guatemalan
population to target.
The CIA‟s role in inciting the counterrevolution was centered upon increasing the
chances that a recruited Guatemalan exile, Castillo Armas, would succeed in leading a
coup that would force Arbenz‟s resignation. However, for many of the planners working
inside CIA headquarters in Washington, knowledge of Guatemala, and more specifically
the revolution of 1944, was obscure. In order to carry out destabilization efforts, an
enhanced understanding of the country was imperative. A document produced on
September 4, 1953 helped to educate CIA operatives. The author of the document gave a
brief historical analysis of the nation‟s politics, provided population statistics, and
supplied an economic assessment. According to the document‟s author, the increasing
toleration of communist activity within the country by Juan Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz
64
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lead to increasing radical and nationalistic policies incongruent to American interests in
the country. When Arbenz began to institute his agrarian reforms, it was erroneously
believed that communists held 51 of the 56 seats in the Guatemalan legislature and
dominated more than fifty percent of the government bureaucracies. The report briefed
Agency planners that efforts to secure a successful counterrevolution could only be
achieved by “preparing a more favorable climate inside of Guatemala.” A preliminary
estimate of how long it would take to prepare for a psychological warfare campaign was
four to six months and the CIA placed a greater emphasis on this in the fall of 1953. 65
For CIA planners of the propaganda campaign, the ability to convince the
Guatemalan public that its government was not serving its best interests was a
complicated task. To convince the population that its government was falling under
communist control, the CIA needed careful planning. An assessment in August 1953
provided guidelines for which measures to employ prior to launching any massive antigovernment propaganda campaign. To the CIA planners, it was imperative that evidence
be obtained to support the notion that Arbenz‟s government had mismanaged the country
and that Guatemala was in worse shape in 1953 than when Arbenz took office in 1950.
The CIA also needed to secure military and radio facilities inside Guatemala and garner
support from other Central American nations to launch their program. 66
In late 1953, the CIA analyzed the Guatemalan government‟s sympathies toward
communism in the country. A secret report distributed only to members of the Agency in
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October 1953 revealed that the Arbenz government provided significant aid to
communist media sources by censoring anti-communist propaganda from student groups
and other media sources for its attacks on the Arbenz government for supporting
communism. The report also revealed that producers of communist publications, such as
the daily Tribuna Popular, handed out their newspapers free of charge to government
officials who took them home for fear of losing their job. For the CIA, this implied that
propaganda sympathetic to communism infiltrated the government. The information
gathered from this CIA document also suggested that communists were using the social
reform policies instituted by the Arbenz government and utilizing them as a means to
connect communist interest to the overall Guatemalan welfare. 67 As suggested by the
Agency‟s report, from the time of Arbenz‟s election, to the time in which Operation
PBSUCCESS was in its preliminary planning stages, communist activity in the country
progressed to the point that it presented the Agency with a difficult task to ensure that its
message was heard by the Guatemalan people. However, it also gave the CIA fuel to
attack the government‟s censorship of the free press by indicating that the Guatemalan
government was possibly moving toward a communist dictatorship.
The plans undertaken by the CIA to institute its propaganda campaign in
Guatemala centered first upon the education of the Latin American populace as to the
dangers of international communism. It was broken down into three phases which were
to commence on December 1, 1953. The objective of this operation was to inform the
people and the governments of the circum-Caribbean of the theoretical tenets of
communism. The Agency also wished to show how communism negatively affected
67
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other countries that fell to it by explaining the political, economic, and social
ramifications of international Marxism. To achieve this, the CIA championed the
capitalist economic system in a positive light and focused on reforms that could alleviate
the economic and social ills plaguing much of the region. These reforms included plans
to lower the cost of living, technical education of farmers, and agrarian reform directed at
creating a new class of small property owners. It proposed scheduling international
meetings with leaders from these countries in order to incorporate these proposals.
Guatemala was the primary target of these efforts.68 This report took into consideration
the socioeconomic problems afflicting people in this region and suggested instituting a
constructive propaganda campaign to promote the capitalist system. Its suggestions
sought to invoke an understanding that, if given a choice, embracing communism would
not relieve the quandaries that Latin American people endured. Rather, only by
embracing a capitalist system would sufficient economic and social reforms be enacted to
assuage these hardships.
Convincing a large number of Guatemalan people to comprehend ideas that a
capitalist system served their best interests amid government censorship in Guatemala
was a daunting assignment. In an effort to show that Arbenz was suppressing the free
press, the CIA engineered to place a newspaper flier into circulation that it intended to
have hindered or even confiscated by operatives working within the Arbenz
government.69 The Agency clearly had two goals in mind. First, the confiscation of the
newspaper provided the CIA with the evidence it needed to show that the Guatemalan
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government smothered a free press. Second, it also allowed the Agency to test the
government‟s ability to censor anti-communist propaganda in the country. The
intelligence obtained through this effort helped the CIA execute SHERWOOD and the
psychological warfare campaign through religious services in 1954 by providing the
Agency with better knowledge of where to establish the radio site and where to have
Guatemalan priests broadcast their anti-communist message.70
To advance its propaganda campaign, the CIA sent many of its intelligence
officials to Guatemala during the planning stages of Operation PBSUCCESS in an effort
to provide the planners in Washington with a background of the country. On December
1, 1953 a report was released to CIA Headquarters that provided an enhanced political
understanding of the Guatemalan government. The report showed a connection between
top communist officials in Guatemala and those in the Soviet Union. For example, the
author stated that José Miguel Fortuny, leader of the Guatemalan Workers‟ Party and a
suspected communist, visited the Soviet Union for several weeks in October 1952.
Guatemalan delegations were also sent to nearly every peace and labor congress held in
the communist nations of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 71 The information
contained in this report did not directly link Guatemala to the Soviet Union or other
communist nations. However, it did provide evidence that top Guatemalan government
officials were sympathetic to communism and the Soviet bloc. As the CIA planned its
propaganda campaign, this background work helped to show which standards needed to
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be a primary focus when the campaign was launched. The report emphasized that
communists in Guatemala “talked a Marxist line”. In other words, the government
officials advocated programs that helped the working class and the peasantry. However,
government officials were disconnected from these segments of the Guatemalan
population as they lived and grew up in the cities and never experienced the economic
struggles that many of the workers and peasants had. To the CIA planners, the rhetoric
used by communists in the countryside sounded like it derived from the Soviet Union and
not from Guatemala. The document advised specifically for the Agency to “keep in mind
the clear distinction between the communizing government of Guatemala and the
Guatemalan people themselves.” 72 By obtaining the evidence of the obvious differences
between the Guatemalan people and their government, it allowed the CIA to build solid
case against Arbenz and the officials working under him.
The CIA‟s intentions to subvert communists in Guatemala centered first on
recruiting anti-communist groups operating within the country and in neighboring El
Salvador and Honduras. Of the groups most opposed to communism were middle and
upper class university students. In Guatemala the organization, Comite de Estudiantes
Universitarios Anticomunistas (CEUA), staunchly opposed communism and held antiArbenz demonstrations as early as 1951 in Guatemala City. The publication of the
CEUA, entitled Boletin del CEUAGE, overtly produced its propaganda from
Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Assessments of this propaganda by the CIA revealed the
publications to be of a “higher caliber” than most documents of each type due to the
writers having an intellectual background. The Agency believed that the newsletter
produced by the CEUA was intended for an audience of middle and upper class readers.
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The writer of an assessment report recommended to the Agency that it was necessary to
continue to utilize the Boletin del CEUAGE and continue to make sure that it reached its
target audience in large numbers. 73 Inspired by the victories of the CEUA propaganda
efforts, the Agency began to encourage the CEUA to use other methods aside from
printed material to get its message to a wider audience.
The CEUA used numerous tactics which included spreading over 100,000 stickers
on buses and trains, defacing walls with anti-communist graffiti, sending funeral notices
to Arbenz and José Miguel Fortuny, and a very effective campaign in March and April
1954 where they painted the number 32 on city wall. The number 32 represented Decree
32 of the Guatemalan constitution which forbade international politics in the country and
was obviously a message cast to criticize the Arbenz government for allowing Soviet
interference. The CEUA also sponsored a radio program entitled “Anti-Communist
Hour” on Radio Internacional. On April 21, 1954, armed thugs entered the radio station
as the program was broadcasts, beat up the broadcasters, and broke all of the station‟s
equipment. 74 The utilization of the student group by the CIA proved very valuable for
three reasons. One, it allowed for the CIA to gather sufficient intelligence about the
people of Guatemala and how receptive they were to various propaganda efforts. Two, it
also helped the CIA attack the Guatemalan government while its own propaganda efforts
were still in the planning stages. Third, and possibly most important, it showed the CIA
that supporters of the Arbenz government and the government itself were capable of
destroying the CIA‟s own radio propaganda program. Realizing this potential, it allowed
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the Agency to make revisions to its security for the SHERWOOD program before it was
launched on May 1. By May 1954, when the CEUA grew tired of what it felt was the
CIA “using” it, plans for the CIA‟s own psychological warfare campaign were already
complete and being put into action.75

The Guatemalan Challenge
Communist propaganda emanating from inside and outside of Guatemala became
a concern for the CIA in the fall of 1953. The Guatemalan government‟s supporters and
communist backers in Guatemala called for “revolutionary solidarity” within the country
amidst rumors of a potential U.S. invasion force to overthrow Arbenz. 76 Militant anticommunists in Guatemala lacked cohesion and the ability to promote a successful counter
effort to the growing communist influence in the country. Theodore Geiger, the chief
researcher of the National Planning Association, produced a report entitled “Communism
versus Progress in Guatemala” in November 1953 that implied there was a need for U.S.
action if communism was to be defeated in the country. He noted that the communists
gained and sustained power within the country by taking control of press and radio
outlets. According to Geiger, this was not “the result of a widespread popular
revolutionary movement.” Rather, the ineptitude of non-communists within the
Guatemalan government and the lack of a cohesive opposition generated by anticommunists within the country enabled communists to gain more control after Arbenz
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ascended to the presidency. 77 As the CIA formulated its plans to introduce anticommunist propaganda into Guatemala, independent research such as this provided
useful insight to the Agency. It also highlighted the obstacles the CIA would have to
overcome in order to effectively carry out its campaign.
Intelligence gathered by the CIA in the fall of 1953 highlighted the key regions
from which communist propaganda emanated. A secret CIA document released to
members of the Agency on December 4, 1953 revealed that communist activity was
highly concentrated along the border of Guatemala and El Salvador. From here,
communist propaganda was created and distributed to couriers for release into both
Guatemala and El Salvador.78 Of interest is the fact that both anti-communist and procommunist propaganda developed in border regions of Guatemala, providing further
proof to the CIA that the situation was extremely delicate especially since most U.S.
officials subscribed to the “domino theory.” If communism succeeded in Guatemala, the
potential for its spread to neighboring countries was very high.
On November 30, 1953, the Guatemalan ambassador to the United States,
Guillermo Toriello, charged the United States State Department with distributing
propaganda aimed at undermining the Guatemalan government. In his accusations, he
referred to these efforts as an “intervention” on the part of the U.S. government. He also
noted the connections between State Department officials and UFCO. 79 The charges
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brought by Toriello were dangerous for CIA officials planning the propaganda operations
since it planted the idea of U.S. intervention in the country. The revelation of U.S.
intervention gave the Arbenz government more ability to discredit any half truths that the
CIA planted about his connections to international communism. It also made it more
difficult to convince the Guatemalan people of the association that Arbenz‟s government
had with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it complicated diplomatic discussions taking
place in Washington and Guatemala City. If the United States chose to expel Toriello for
his charges, the CIA felt that it was highly likely that the Guatemalans would do the same
to the new U.S. ambassador to Guatemala, John Peurifoy. Peurifoy was handpicked by
Dwight Eisenhower‟s administration to resolve the situation. A staunch anti-communist
and troubleshooter, Peurifoy was tasked with gathering intelligence in his discussions
with Jacobo Arbenz and other top government officials. The fear of his expulsion from
Guatemala due to deteriorating relations between the two countries caused great concern
for the CIA. Realizing that the Guatemalan government could discredit U.S. propaganda
helped the CIA develop its messages for its radio broadcasts by sending the
communication that the broadcasters were Guatemalans fighting for freedom rather than
American broadcasters. This gave credence to the charges brought by Radio Liberación
when it launched in May 1954.
In response to the accusations set forth by Ambassador Guillermo Toriello, the
CIA formulated methods to discredit the indictments brought by Toriello. It suggested
that the United States draft a statement to the Guatemalan people that the accusative
remarks by certain officials within its government in no way indicated that a
disconnection was occurring or would occur between the Guatemalan and American
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people, and that friendly accords between them would continue unabated despite the
confrontational tone of the Guatemalan government.80 The Assistant Secretary of State
for Latin American Affairs, John M. Cabot, publicly claimed that it was not the intention
of the United States to intervene in any internal affairs of its neighbors to the south. At
the Annual Conference on the Caribbean at the University of Florida on December 3,
1953, Cabot remarked that it pledged in 1933 in Montevideo, Uruguay that it would not
intervene in the other republics in the hemisphere. For twenty years the United States did
not rescind that promise.81 Surely, with more than three decades of U.S. interference in
Latin America after the War of 1898 with Spain, Cabot‟s remarks were not all that
assuring. “It is far easier for Latin Americans to become disturbed over „Yankee
interference‟ than over the charges of communism in the Western hemisphere,” wrote
Sydney Gruson, a writer for the New York Times, in an article published on December 23,
1953.82 For the planners of Operation PBSUCCESS, this was the greatest challenge
confronting them. The Good Neighbor Policy stood for two decades but the security
threats in a key economic region close to the Panama Canal made it very difficult for the
United States to continue this policy. The CIA specifically needed to ensure that its
preparatory work and the launch of the invasion remained concealed so further charges of
U.S. intervention were not brought before the United Nations or Organization of
American States. The psychological intelligence that aided the radio broadcasts and
helped influence religious leaders in Guatemala enabled the CIA to do this. PI allowed
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the Agency to overtly destabilize the political situation in Guatemala and retain plausible
deniability.

Political Themes for the Propaganda Program
The Central Intelligence Agency had one goal in mind when it launched its
propaganda campaign against Jacobo Arbenz and his government: preparing the
Guatemalan people for a military operation whereby they would interpret any sign of
force against their government as the commencement of a mass uprising. This formula
was borrowed from the successful CIA operation in 1953 called Operation AJAX in
Iran.83 The CIA attacked international communism and the Guatemalan government‟s
ties to it. The Agency planned to use the radio broadcasts as a means to carry out this
portion of its operation. Tracing the history of Guatemala‟s governments, the CIA
insinuated that all economic and political ideologies were borrowed: from liberal
democracy to capitalism to fascism. When the 1944 Revolution installed a social
democratic regime, it was, again, a borrowed principle. Drawing upon this theme of
foreign ideology, the CIA called communism the worst of all. The Agency explained to
the Guatemalan people that communism only influenced the country because
Guatemalans were too lazy to think for themselves and borrowed an ideology emanating
from a “Slavic power 6000 miles away.” 84
As with its entire intelligence gathering for Operation PBSUCCESS, the CIA
employed a plethora of means to acquire the psychological fuel to conduct its propaganda
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efforts. To obtain a greater insight of what caused the political developments in
Guatemala from 1944-1953, the Agency drew upon the conclusions reached by an
“outstanding” American student in Latin American history who presented a paper to a
collection of US historians in November 1953.85 The student concluded that the
communists in Guatemala could join with zealous Guatemalan nationalists to attack U.S.
imperialism in the country. Because of this common cause, the student asserted that the
communists were able to maintain influence on the Guatemalan government without
worry of political attack. The result of the patriotism of the Revolution of 1944 helped to
consolidate a wide base of popular support and a large expansion of the politically active
people in the country. The student advised the U.S. government to distinguish between
the nationalism of the revolutionary movement and the communists that benefitted from
aligning themselves with the fervent nationalism associated with many of the avant-garde
policies instituted in the country since 1944.86 The CIA incorporated this intelligence
into its radio broadcasts. In particular, the Agency distinguished Jacobo Arbenz from
international communism. On May 12, 1954, for the 7:30 AM broadcast, Radio
Liberación alluded to a “conspiracy” cooked up in Moscow to utilize a well-known
Panamanian named Jorge Isaac Delgado to falsify documents that proved Arbenz correct
in his assertions that a foreign invasion was pending. The CIA‟s transmission avowed
that Arbenz would quickly remove all military and civilian officials who did not support
the government and replace them with communists. Once the communists gained control
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of these critical posts in the government, the broadcast warned, a full-fledged communist
dictatorship would become established in Guatemala. 87 The CIA attacked Arbenz for
allowing international communism to gain such an influence in Guatemala. Taking into
account the intelligence it received from the paper presented in November 1953, the
broadcast did not attack the nationalism displayed by his government which planted a
seed of fear that Arbenz was a liability to Guatemala because he intended to replace all
unsupportive military and government officials with communists.
Radio Liberación intended to broadcast political propaganda to a varied audience.
The military was the primary target of the propaganda, but many of its political programs
were also tailored toward intellectuals, women, workers, and peasants. The programs
contained dramatic background music that helped to build the suspense for the
information about to be announced. Of the twelve recurring programs played on the
station, most contained at least some measure of political commentary. “Rompiendo las
Cadenas” (“Breaking the Chains”) focused on the economics of Guatemala in relation to
communism. By the end of May, as tensions began to escalate, Radio Liberación began
broadcasting news segments on its programs. The news segments that the CIA chose to
broadcast also had a motive. They focused on specific events that helped it further show
that communists were acquiring greater influence over the country and also worked to
belittle government officials and their relatives. 88 The political propaganda contained in
the SHERWOOD broadcasts was extremely effective in destabilizing the country and
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was vital to the success of the operation. For it to have the effect that it did, though, the
psychological intelligence gathered by the CIA in the months leading up to its launch was
even more important than the political commentary.

Picking Out a Location for the Radio Broadcasts
In order to implement the SHERWOOD radio program, the Agency needed to
prepare for and overcome a number of obstacles. “[T]echnical feasibility, political
tenability, and problems of security” were a few of the factors taken into consideration as
the CIA looked at sites from which to broadcast their radio programs. In order to
maintain the clandestine nature of the broadcasts, and the site from which it emanated,
the CIA was forced to select a position located within 250 miles of the target area of the
broadcast in order to use medium power transmitting equipment. The use of highpowered equipment enabled the CIA to broadcast from nearly anywhere in the
hemisphere and Guatemalans would still receive the transmission. However, using
higher technology risked the chance of exposing the CIA as the broadcasters of the
channel. Low-powered transmitting equipment prevented the signal from reaching all of
the women, military personnel, intellectuals, and workers that the CIA intended to reach.
Therefore, the medium-powered equipment was utilized by the Agency. 89
Prior to launching the operation, the Agency needed to insure that broadcasts
could continue should a power failure occur (or the government cut the power) during the
militant phases of Operation PBSUCCESS when Castillo Armas‟ men were to carry out
the coup. In response to this potential roadblock, a document issued within the CIA on
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March 20, 1954 recommended that fifty battery-powered short and long wave radio
transmitters be purchased in New York and shipped to Guatemala under a fictitious brand
name. The report recommended that a CIA agent arrive simultaneously with the
transmitters and locate specific sites in Guatemala City for the radio transmitters to be
placed and hire six Guatemalans to install them. 90 This plan reaffirmed the instructions
given to the CIA by the Eisenhower Administration. Maintaining plausible deniability
was paramount so that the United States could answer any charges of intervention by
promoting the coup as a Guatemalan affair that did not receive any aid from the United
States. Although subtle in its scope, the installation of battery-powered radios (from New
York no less) foreshadowed an upswing of domestic and international pressure on
Arbenz and his government to resign from the presidency or face attack. By hiring
Guatemalans living within the capitol city, the Agency enabled itself to avoid charges of
intervention by the United States when the campaign was launched. When the Arbenz
government in June ordered a blackout throughout the country in an effort to stop the
broadcasts from being heard in June, the only effect it had was on Castillo Armas‟ air
operations. 91
The site chosen for the radio broadcasts also was carefully selected by the CIA
which was a remote beach in Honduras known as Santa Fe. Because the site was too
distant from Guatemala‟s capital, the radio station broadcasted on a short-wave setting
which was similar to most of the radio broadcasts heard in the country. Guatemalans
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received many of their radio programs on short-wave transmissions from neighboring
Mexico. Throughout the country, the majority of radio sets were short-wave receivers.
Therefore, the choice of Santa Fe was not a problem for the Agency. The primary
problem of the site location was convincing the radio station‟s listeners of what David
Atlee Phillips called the “big lie”. This “big lie” was that the station was located within
Guatemalan territory.92 In order to circumvent this, the Guatemalan operatives hired by
the CIA, Mario López Otero and José Toron Barrios and a third unnamed operative,
purchased advertisement space in Guatemalan newspapers. The advertisement noted that
the original broadcasts would emanate from Mexico on Labor Day, May 1, because all
Guatemalan radio was shut off for the day. Just a week after the first broadcasts of the
Voice of Liberation radio station, unrest within Guatemala was widespread and it soon
turned to anxiety. Within a month, Jacobo Arbenz suspended civil liberties throughout
the country, effectively turning him into the non-democratic leader that the domestic anticommunists and CIA agents previously made him out to be.93 Remarkably, the goals of
the SHERWOOD campaign to destabilize the country worked. The people were fearful
of an invasion and the paranoia that his regime was in jeopardy caused Arbenz to crack
down on civil liberties within the country. An intelligence report arrived in Washington
shortly after the launch of the radio program describing the departure of a ship from
behind the Iron Curtain loaded with armaments destined for Guatemala. The Voice of
Liberation quickly made this information public, further enhancing its charges that the
Guatemalan government was overrun by communists. The radio soon broadcasted that
the armaments were distributed in the Guatemalan countryside to a militia controlled by a
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labor federation loyal to Arbenz. Subsequently, the Voice of Liberation broadcast that
Arbenz intended to replace the Guatemalan military with “a civilian proletariat
constabulary”.94
The political propaganda broadcast over the airwaves clearly unsettled the
stability of Jacobo Arbenz‟s government. Yet, broadcasting charges of communist
takeover and the destruction of the military within the country only were successful due
to the fact that a large number of Guatemalan people tuned in to listen to the programs.
The day before Radio Liberación began, the Arbenz government instituted Congressional
Decree 37 which required all privately-owned radio stations in the country to submit
political discussions to the government for acceptance prior to being allowed to be
broadcast on the airwaves.95 The suspension of independent political discussions
broadcast over the airwaves magnified the impact of Radio Liberación‟s launch on May
1. For the most part, Latin Americans were turned off to politics broadcast over the
airwaves. A number of letters written to the U.S. radio station by Latin American radio
listeners contained in a CIA report dated January 26, 1954 reflect just that. Most of these
listeners stated that they enjoyed good entertainment programs, but despised shows that
consistently pushed a political agenda. 96 However, broadcasting anti-government
propaganda was obviously the goal of the clandestine radio station. For the CIA to reach
its intended audience with its political propaganda it needed subliminal methods to carry
this out. Because of its psychological intelligence gathering on developments within the
Roman Catholic Church, and a fair amount of astuteness on the people it attempted to
94
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reach, the CIA was able to create a psychological warfare machine capable of
undermining the Arbenz government.
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Chapter 3
“Dios, Patria y Libertad”
The Catholic Church Becomes the CIA’s Political Ally
The political attacks on Jacobo Arbenz‟s government from the Central
Intelligence Agency and anti-communist leaders within Guatemala proved to be vital to
the overall triumph of Operation PBSUCCESS in 1953-1954. The effort to coerce
Arbenz to embody the character that this propaganda campaign portrayed was very
complex. One of the most important efforts made by the CIA that made its radio
broadcasts more believable was the inclusion of the Roman Catholic Church in its
propaganda efforts. After World War II, as international communism spread in many
parts of the world, the Roman Catholic Church became increasingly outspoken against
communism, which led it to support U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. The rightwing dictatorships of Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic) and Anastacio Somoza
(Nicaragua), although very authoritative, were supported by the Latin American
bishoprics in the 1950s.97 With support from the most powerful cultural institution in the
region, the Central Intelligence Agency used the Catholic hierarchy in Guatemala to
attack and destabilize Arbenz‟s government. The main issue facing the Agency was the
fact that the Church in Guatemala, though vigilantly opposed to the growing communist
influence in the country, was “handicapped by the small number of priests and by a lack
of a constructive social program.” The Church‟s priests during the late 1800s and into
the 1900s were also subject to deportation as many were immigrants to the country. 98

97

Enrique Dussel, “The Church in Populist Regimes (1930-1959),” in The Church in Latin America, 14921992, Enrique Dussel, ed., (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992) 141.
98
FRUS, Vol. IV, 1034; FRUS: Guatemala, 104

46

However, with the psychological intelligence acquired by the CIA in the weeks and
months leading up to the initiation of Operation PBSUCCESS, the Catholic Church‟s
militancy toward communism became an important tool in the psychological warfare
effort.
Knowing that the Catholic hierarchy in Latin American countries tied themselves
to the ruling class, CIA agent Howard Hunt met with Francis Cardinal Spellman of New
York. In the conversation that ensued between the two, Hunt asked Spellman if it were
possible to coerce the Guatemalan clergy to move against the Arbenz government.
Spellman replied that convincing the Guatemalan clergy to actively attack Arbenz‟s
administration would not be a problem. By April 1954, all attendees at Catholic masses
in Guatemala were called upon by Catholic priests and bishops to “„rise as a single man
against this enemy of God and country‟” which was communism. 99 The efforts of Hunt
to incorporate the Catholic Church into the psychological warfare effort kicked off a
campaign that linked international communism to atheism which the CIA used in its
clandestine radio broadcasts.
When Arbenz became president of Guatemala in 1951, the Roman Catholic
Church in the country had only seven dioceses and one apostolic administration. Plagued
by anti-clerical policies of the Guatemalan dictators starting in 1871, many of the
Church‟s leaders were expelled from the country, its lands were expropriated, its schools
held back, and the separation of Church and state became entrenched. 100 As a result,
efforts to remain a powerful institution within Guatemala became extremely difficult,
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particularly in the countryside. In many parts of Latin America, the Church was
confronted by populist governments that disregarded it. By the 1930s, the Church
throughout Latin America attempted to utilize a program called Catholic Action to
influence the secular world in which they lived. Unlike most other Latin American
countries where it was popular among the urban middle class, Catholic Action was
popular in the rural regions of Guatemala where a long tradition of “indigenous
Catholicism” survived.
Under Jorge Ubico (1931-1944), the Roman Catholic Church in Guatemala
regained some of the losses it suffered under the successive dictatorships of the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. The number of priests increased as well as the amount of lands
the Church owned. After the revolution removed Ubico from power in 1944, a new
constitution was written in 1945 that strengthened the Church within the country.
However, to many of those within the Church‟s hierarchy, the 1945 constitution did not
go far enough to ease the restrictions placed upon it. After local elites lent their support
to the Church and attacked Arévalo‟s government for what it perceived as attacks against
“Christian Guatemala”, the Roman Catholic Church became an opponent of the
revolution which began in 1944.101 Guatemalan Archbishop Mariano Rossell y Arellano
succeeded Archbishop Duroy y Suré in 1938 and took control of Catholic Action in the
country. Rossell y Arellano was an outspoken opponent of communism, one of which
the CIA used to its advantage when the propaganda campaign kicked off in May 1954. 102
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The CIA benefitted from the Church‟s revival in Guatemala. With the threat of a
communist takeover in the country, the chances of a setback to the Church‟s resurgence
in the country increased significantly. Traditionally, Catholic clergy in Guatemala (and
most of Latin America) aligned themselves with the ruling class. 103 Because Guatemalan
elites were virulently anti-communist, the Church followed suit and became a useful ally
in the CIA‟s effort to overthrow Arbenz and remove communists from the country.
As early as 1952, the CIA looked toward Guatemalan religious leaders to carry
out an operation among the Guatemalan people. By 1954, the CIA was in very close
contact with the Guatemalan clergy influencing them to spread anti-Arbenz messages in
their church services. Arrangements were made with the Mariano Rossell y Arellano to
conduct a series of special daily Masses during an eight day period that coincided with
the launch of Operation SHERWOOD. The Archbishop was unaware of the connection
between his Masses and what the CIA called “D-Day.” He was also naïve to the overall
military plans of the Agency. 104 Most interesting about the Agency‟s research to utilize
Rossell y Arellano in this crusade is the fact that the Archbishop spoke out against
communism during Arévalo‟s presidency, long before Arbenz enacted agrarian reform
and defied U.S. policy in the country. The CIA knew that Rossell y Arellano despised
communism and he was the most powerful religious leader in the country, capable of
reaching far greater audiences than printed pamphlets or circulars could.
Throughout Latin America in the early 1900s, Protestant missionaries made
inroads in a predominantly Roman Catholic culture. Many of these missionaries
defended the self-determination of Latin American people and, amidst the increasing
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nationalism in the region by the end of World War II, nationalist leaders, such as Arévalo
and Arbenz, received a great deal of support from Protestants living in Guatemala. 105 As
Guatemala‟s leaders instituted a number of progressive reforms opposed by elites in the
country but supported by Protestants, the Church allied itself with the elites to preserve
its own restitution that began under Ubico. Put another way, the Catholic Church‟s
reaction in the country became increasingly opposed to the Arévalo and Arbenz regimes,
a position that the CIA was able to exaggerate when it launched its campaign in 1953.
In 1947, the Church issued a statement aimed at working class Catholics
attempting to unionize. The workers “were told to adhere to the Church‟s social justice
teachings and not be exploited by Communists.” 106 The CIA was instructed by the
Eisenhower Administration to covertly remove Arbenz and install a government
supportive of U.S. policies.107 In other words, the CIA‟s goals were to install a
government open to capitalism and foreign investment. With the Roman Catholic
Church‟s revelations of its opposition to many of the nationalist policies promoted by the
Arévalo and Arbenz governments, the CIA had a powerful ally inside the country that it
utilized through its psychological warfare campaign. After reorganizing itself to confront
challenges to its hierarchy and adapting to the anti-communist vehemence of the postwar
period, the Roman Catholic Church supported U.S. anti-communist policy in Latin
America, one which the CIA managed to coalesce into its psychological warfare
campaign against Arbenz.
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Educating the Population on the Dangers of Communism to Religious Ideals
In its efforts to stimulate the public against communism, the CIA utilized
psychological intelligence to educate the people of Guatemala of what could happen to
the nation if they did not rise up against the Arbenz government. The Agency did not
believe that revealing religious subversion that occurred in nations behind the Iron
Curtain was enough to convince the Guatemalan people that it the same would occur
there. Rather, the CIA presented specific consequences for the religious institutions in
Guatemala if communists were allowed to succeed. For example, the Agency revealed to
through various media sources that Catholic iconography was likely to be replaced by
images of Vladimir Lenin, Josef Stalin, and Georgy Malenkov. The CIA also
broadcasted messages that Guatemalan Catholic churches were to become meeting
houses for communists to plan attacks against the faithful in the country.108 The CIA
realized that providing examples of religious subversion in countries thousands of miles
away would not have the same effect as illustrations specific to Guatemalan churches.
The methods used by the Agency centered on the people‟s religious mores and helped to
instill fear among the Guatemalan people that a communist takeover would result in the
destruction of their religious institutions. Furthermore, this made the CIA‟s goal of
acquiring supporters of a counterrevolution more possible. Showing how communism
subverted religion within a country where faith existed regardless of location allowed the
CIA to expand its psychological warfare program to the Guatemalan countryside. The
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CIA in late April 1954 sought to expand the Catholic anti-communist mobilization efforts
into the working class operating in Guatemala‟s rural regions. 109
As the CIA began its preparations for the “invasion” of Guatemala by Castillo
Armas‟ forces, propositions for a resolution condemning Guatemala as a communist
beachhead were drawn up. The major issues that the Agency had to confront involved
convincing other Latin American countries that halting communism in Guatemala (and
elsewhere) required outside intervention (implying American intervention through
economic aid and armaments). Once again, the Catholic Church became a major tool for
the CIA. On May 27, 1954 a conference entitled “First Continental Congress against
Soviet Intervention in Latin America” was held at the Cervantes Theater in Mexico
City. 110 Instead of focusing religious propaganda on the Guatemalan people, the CIA
recruited a Guatemalan delegate by the name of Luis Coronado Lira to warn the rest of
Latin America of the communist menace that was plaguing his country. At a meeting in
May 1954 to invoke the agreement reached at Caracas, Venezuela in March of that year,
he delivered this message. 111 Lira falsely exaggerated his government‟s intentions to
intervene in the nation‟s schools, preventing religious education from being taught to the
young in the country. He also warned the other Latin American delegates that
communism was only expanding gradually and if unopposed, a rule of atheism would
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take control of Guatemala and spread to the rest of the Western Hemisphere. 112 As the
CIA posited these same claims through various media outlets in Guatemala, so too did it
work to prepare to influence other Latin American delegations that communism
threatened organized religion worldwide. This allowed the United States to connect civil
liberties, like freedom of religion, to its global campaign against international
communism. Religious revival in other parts of the globe in the 1930s and 1940s also
aided the United States in its efforts to contain communism after World War II.
Before, during, and just after World War II, throughout Latin America, “the
renewal of parishes as „missionary communities‟” became standard as Jesuit priests,
many influenced by the Church‟s revival in postwar France, instituted a new system of
pastoral practice. This helped to spawn national conferences of bishops, ushering in a
sense of religious nationalism. 113 In Guatemala, the CIA used this to its advantage when
attempting to portray its anti-communist message to the peasantry in Guatemala.
Because the Guatemalan Church‟s leaders were also unified in their efforts to fight
communism in their country, the CIA managed to arrange meetings with many of the
Church‟s priests in April 1954 to instruct them on how best to carry out a propaganda
program in their churches. As a result, each Sunday thereafter, attendees of Catholic
Church services, many of whom were from the peasantry and working classes, listened to
anti-communist rhetoric from the Catholic priests. This propaganda came from people
that the peasants were far more likely to pay attention to than those in the secular
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world.114 This effort helped to reach a segment of the Guatemalan population that was
unreachable by other methods the CIA incorporated to broadcast its message and further
helped the Agency to destabilize the country in the weeks leading up to Castillo Armas‟
invasion.
Despite the many uses of the Roman Catholic Church by the CIA during its
propaganda/education campaign and the success it had with many of the people it
attempted to reach, there were problems with convincing the entire population that
communism threatened religious freedom. As agents in the field observed the situation in
the Guatemalan countryside and in the industrial sector, they realized that the Church had
a strong reluctance to interfere in labor disputes. It did not attempt to impose religious
convictions on the nation‟s labor unions. The CIA also realized by early June 1954 that
Guatemalans listened to the political propaganda through the radio and printing press but
this did not have much effect in inspiring the labor unions to oppose the government.
These unions were very dangerous to the overall success of the operation. The CIA
estimated that labor unions controlled by communists or communist sympathesizers had
the capability to arm and confront Castillo Armas‟ forces when they arrived or, if unable
to safeguard Arbenz‟s government, send the Guatemalan economy into a tailspin by
calling for nationwide strikes. 115 Throughout the campaign, the CIA had agents working
in the field that continued to provide the necessary psychological intelligence in order to
carry out Operation PBSUCCESS. In this particular case, the psychological intelligence
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provided key information on a segment of the population where the Church was not
going to be a key collaborator.
The Roman Catholic priests and bishops played a critical role in the CIA‟s
religious propaganda campaign. Using its psychological intelligence research and
employing the internal developments within the Catholic Church in Latin America, the
CIA managed to reach a much larger audience than the printing press and radio could
accomplish alone. However, the intended audience for this propaganda effort remained
the urban population (i.e. the middle and upper classes as well as the educated students
and teachers). The best means to incorporate the religious psychological intelligence to
sway their opinion was through the clandestine radio program, Radio Liberación.

Radio Liberación and the Catholic Church
The SHERWOOD campaign kicked off on May 1, 1954 and had a large urban
audience. As a program primarily designed to destabilize the country and provoke the
Guatemalan people to rebel against their government, Radio Liberación carried messages
often repeated on air so that the communications stuck with its listeners. Trabajo, Pan, y
Patria (translated to Work, Bread, and Country), the station‟s slogan, invoked a message
in its own right with its implication that the clandestine broadcasts were in support of the
welfare of the Guatemalan people. This leftist slogan appealed to the Guatemalan people
and undercut the communists‟ program because it implied that the station‟s broadcasters
wanted to help the people while at the same time opposing the Arbenz government. It
also sent the message that the broadcasts were not influenced by foreigners (mainly
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agents working for the United States).116 The daily broadcasts also carried messages that
were utilized to summon discontent within the Guatemalan people for their government.
These communications carried with them cultural and religious overtones aimed at
striking down communism. Warning the Guatemalan people that if it embraced
communism, as its government had, Guatemala would be subjected to an imperialism
greater than any other known to mankind; an atheist ideology that had its roots thousands
of miles away. The memorandums also attempted to strike fear into the minds of
Guatemalan Catholics with allusions to Pope Pius XII‟s decree in 1950 that all who
accepted communism would be excommunicated from the Church. 117
Like its agents in the field and through the printing press, the CIA‟s broadcasts on
Radio Liberación sought to educate the Guatemalan population of the dangers of
communism. By conducting research on the target audience, it was estimated that sixty
percent of the population was indifferent to the Arbenz regime. 118 The moral traditions
of the majority of the population were based in religious doctrine (overwhelmingly
Roman Catholic). The CIA used this to its advantage when it began its radio broadcasts.
“The Ideological Decalogue”, which was a series of specific statements addressing why
Guatemalans should not allow communism, attacked communist ideology on moral
grounds. It stated that Guatemalans should not allow communist activity to expand
because it denied “the existence of God as beginning and end of the purest ideals of the
human being,” it destroyed “faith, ideals, and the spirit of self-improvement”, and
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ignored “the existence of moral values.” 119 Under Jorge Ubico, Guatemala experienced a
revival in the Catholic Church within the country. Groups such as Catholic Action and
Opus Dei managed to bring about this revival among student groups, professional people,
and married couples; precisely the main target audience of the CIA for Radio
Liberación.120 By positing the potential assailment of communist ideology on the
religious morals that many of the nation‟s people harbored, the CIA led its audience into
believing in the dangers associated with its government.
Many of the communications relayed by the CIA‟s clandestine radio station
carried a very ominous message to its listeners regarding the prospects for the Catholic
Church‟s survival in a communist country. These strongly-worded points made by Radio
Liberación were often repeated in several of its broadcasts throughout the two months
that the station remained on Guatemalan airwaves. The messages were primarily
intended for Guatemalan listeners but also served as a warning to other Latin American
countries of the implications of communism. Calling Earth the “Heaven toward which
communism advances,” the messages implied that communism had no use for an
organized religion so long as its economic system was in place. When every human
becomes equal, as communism aspires to, Heaven would be created on Earth, a false
hope for those who believed in God and believed that someday they would ascend to
paradise.121 Other messages revealed to the Guatemalan listeners that in a Soviet world,
the people were handicapped; unable to demand wage increases or change jobs, pray, or
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believe in God.122 The CIA played upon the fears of the Christian population; revealing
that if allowed to succeed, communism would strip away their spiritual rite. 123
The religious overtones contained in the refrains of Radio Liberación’s broadcasts
also contained some encouraging statements for the people who fought against
communism. Utilizing Christian virtues, listeners of the radio station were encouraged to
use charity and social justice, two elements of the Church advocated by its priests, to
defeat communism. The CIA utilized its knowledge of the Church‟s teachings, not
condoning violence but passively resisting the spread of communism, to support this
message. Advocating an aggressive reaction may have brought the authenticity of the
radio station into question or, at the very least, caused some listeners to tune out. Calling
communism an “apocalyptic beast”, the refrain reassured its Christian followers that
when communist domination was defeated, God would allow the world to live in the
peace of Jesus Christ.124 To reach the masses of people that seemed to be in a perpetual
system of social injustice, Radio Liberación emphasized to its listeners that the Church,
throughout history, called on those with riches and power to give to those who did not,
even hypocritically using Marxist terminology such as “proletariat” to relay its
message. 125 By attacking from the left, the CIA‟s propaganda managed to take away the
one strong argument (social justice) that supporters of the Arbenz regime had. After
Guatemalan government officials brought charges against the United States for being
involved in a plot to overthrow the Arbenz government in January 1954 in a military
122
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coup, the invocations set forth by the clandestine radio broadcasts discouraging violence
as a means to defeat communism gave Radio Liberación legitimacy as a radio station
operated by Guatemalans and not the United States.126
Further aiding the CIA‟s attempt to ensure that the station was regarded by the
Guatemalan people as an operation carried out by exiled Guatemalans were references to
Vatican statements. Rebutting statements made by Guerra Borges that the Catholic
Church tailored its policy toward the best interests of capitalists, Radio Liberación
broadcasted messages citing three famous papal encyclicals which showed that the
Church engendered its policies toward achieving a social justice for all of its followers.
The messages stated that the Church supported the plights of the world‟s peasantry and
pressured world leaders to enact agrarian reforms and increases in workers‟ wages. 127
Again, this leftist message offered by the radio station‟s religious broadcasts signified
that the Church supported the reforms that would help alleviate the quandaries plaguing
the peasantry but, at the same time, showed that supporting communism and leaders like
Arbenz would work to eliminate any chance of Church aid. All of this helped lend
credence to the CIA‟s attempts to maintain its plausible deniability. After many charges
of cohesion between the United Fruit Company, the Agency, and the Eisenhower
Administration (who were all accused of supporting repression of the peasants) to bring
about the overthrow of Arbenz in response to his agrarian reform laws in 1952, citing the
papal encyclicals provided further “proof” to the Guatemalan people that the radio station
was operated by Guatemalans living in exile which increased its legitimacy.
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The attacks against the Roman Catholic Church in communist countries around
the world aided the CIA immensely as it broadcast its anti-communist propaganda on
Radio Liberación. Citing many of the more provocative events that appeared in the
Roman Catholic press, such as the murder of a priest in Lithuania, the expulsion of
missionaries in China, and the fact that only one bishop remained in all of Bulgaria, the
station made a strong connection between the speeches given by Archbishop Rossell y
Arellano and the statements emanating from the Vatican. 128
The psychological intelligence conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency on
religion throughout Latin America and its subsequent implementation into action played
a key role in its propaganda campaign through Operation SHERWOOD, and homilies
given by priests in Guatemala, allowed the Agency‟s message to be heard by a wide
audience. For the purposes of its radio broadcasts, though, other methods needed to be
employed, not just the work of religious statements condemning communism for its
attacks on organized religion. The psychological intelligence conducted on what Latin
American radio listeners preferred to hear on programs proved to play a vital role in the
overall success of the propaganda campaign carried out by Radio Liberación.
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Chapter 4
“Dance to the Rhythm They Play for You”
How Entertainment Destabilized Guatemala
“Atención Guatemala! Atención Guatemaltecos! Radio
Liberación les habla. Esta es la emisora clandestina Radio
Liberación, operando en su frequencia de onda corta y
desde algun lugar secreto del territorio nacional.
Escuchenos Usted y sabra la realidad del momento politico
por que atraviesa Guatemala, y los progresos irrefutables
del gran movimiento libertador. Durante el transcurso de
nuestras transmisiones diarias, damos a Ustedes musica,
comentarios y noticias en general, y demostramos
palpablemente el crimen de la dominación comunista y la
fuerza incontenible del movimiento libertador
guatemalteco. En el aire los transmisores clandestinos de
Radio Liberación!” 129
The preceding was a sign-on used by the CIA clandestine radio station when it
began its daily transmissions. Beginning on May 1, 1954, all Guatemalans who had
access to a short-wave radio set and tuned in to the station‟s frequency heard this or the
second of two messages the CIA prepared to begin each broadcast. Of particular note in
this sign-on is the incitation that the station would provide music programs and news
along with a demonstration of the crime of communist domination and the Guatemalan
liberation movement. The radio station did not broadcast an hour long political
commentary denouncing communism and Jacobo Arbenz. Rather, the station provided
entertainment throughout its broadcasts set between the political commentary in order to
keep listeners from switching their radio dials or turning their sets off completely.
In the days preceding the launch of Radio Liberación, the CIA purchased ad space
in Guatemalan newspapers to publicize the initiation of a new radio station that featured
129
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“a galaxy of Latin stars”. The advertisement proclaimed that the radio programs would
contain Maria Felix, a well-known and beautiful Mexican actress, numerous singers, and
Mexican film star Cantinflas, who in the 1950s was one of the best-known men in Latin
American popular culture. As payment for these advertisements, an associate of the
Guatemalans hired to conduct the radio broadcasts traveled to Guatemala shortly after the
station‟s launch and paid the newspaper companies in cash for the half-page printed
advertisements. On May 1st, Labor Day in Guatemala (and around the world with the
exception of the United States), all radio transmissions operating within the country shut
down. Hence, Radio Liberación was forced to tell its audience that it operated from
inside of Mexico on its first day. By broadcasting on May 1, the CIA maximized its
potential listening audience because no other radio stations were on the air in Guatemala.
The newspaper ads promoting Latin American pop culture icons were not entirely
deceptive as the station broadcast cassette recordings of these individuals. Guatemalans
were told that the recordings were necessary due to the Guatemalan government‟s
censorship of the media which began two days before the station was launched. 130 From
the outset, Radio Liberación captured its audience by providing entertainment in its
broadcasts. Over the two months that the station remained on the airwaves, the CIA
utilized the psychological intelligence it gathered in the months preceding the launch of
the SHERWOOD program to provide its listeners with music programs that they enjoyed,
oftentimes sneaking in satirical lines about the Arbenz government within the music
itself. Each broadcast contained a purpose. Some of the broadcasts used a female
announcer to gain the attention of women in the country to sway their husbands and sons
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to participate in the rebellion against the government, while others invoked the necessity
of the army to join the rebel cause. 131

Plans for Radio Propaganda in Guatemala
As the CIA continued its efforts to launch a psychological assault on the
Guatemalan government, important new intelligence was gathered by January 1954. The
reports that the CIA received regarding the capabilities for successful radio propaganda
proved to be fundamental to the Radio Liberación program that was launched in May of
that year. In 1954, the Agency estimated that approximately 71,000 shortwave radio sets
were owned by people living in Guatemala. Of these 71,000 sets, 68 percent were owned
by people living in the urban areas around Guatemala City and Quezaltenango, while the
other 32 percent were scattered amongst the rest of the rural Guatemalan population. The
CIA estimated that its radio broadcasts would be heard by the propertied classes of
Guatemala which included business professionals, military men, and students in the
nation‟s universities. 132 What is important to note about this information is the fact that
the CIA now had a target audience about which to concentrate its broadcasts. Even
though the Agency had intentions to reach the entire population through its psychological
warfare efforts, the knowledge obtained about the number of radio sets in Guatemala and
the owners of those sets allowed the CIA to formulate its broadcasts directly at one
specific group. To the vast majority of the population that lived in rural areas without
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electricity or a radio, the CIA utilized other means to transmit its message, mainly in the
form of circulars and pamphlets.133 Most of the rural residents in Guatemala were
illiterate, however, which made this a much less successful, and far less entertaining,
program than the radio broadcasts.
As important as it was for the CIA to know who the target audience was for its
radio propaganda campaign, it was even more important to understand what caused those
lucky enough to own a shortwave radio in Guatemala to tune in and listen to the
programs transmitted over the airwaves. Good communication between the Agency and
U.S.-based shortwave radio stations provided this crucial information. The radio station
found, through frequent letters written to it by Latin American listeners, that the most
important feature of a good radio program was good music. Contained in a CIA report
dated January 26, 1954 were some of the letters written by Latin American listeners to
the American shortwave radio programs, which also included six written by Guatemalan
listeners. A salient facet of the letters were that nearly every one contained a remark or
two about the music broadcast on the radio program and a strong appreciation for the
cultural aspects of the radio station‟s broadcasts. Many of the other writers stated that
they did not wish to hear news or political commentary on the station because this could
easily be obtained from other stations. 134 This intelligence obtained by the CIA proved
invaluable to its efforts later in 1954 when its “Voice of Liberation” radio broadcasts
were launched.
Through careful intelligence gathering and the communications between the CIA
and private U.S. radio stations, by January 1954, the Agency developed a plan on which
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types of broadcasts would be most useful in presenting the Guatemalans with a different
picture of their leader. Aside from the assertions of Arbenz‟s connections to international
communism, the CIA saw it necessary to include entertaining broadcasts in its radio
program. With the knowledge that Latin Americans had an affinity toward classical
music, the Agency moved to acquire many of the recordings of Spanish and Latin
American classical artists that were available at the time. At a cost of approximately fifty
dollars for a five to six hour broadcast, the Agency believed the best method to obtain the
music records was to imagine itself as an owner of a Guatemalan radio station provided
with money and free passage through customs to purchase the music in New York. The
writer of the intelligence report from January 26, 1954 suggested the following as the
best broadcast materials for entertainment purposes for the clandestine radio channel: A
selection of Russian composers, who were requested by Latin American listeners to
American radio channels, poetry readings specifically intended to grab the attention of
intellectuals and students living in urban areas within the country, music with a religious
appeal, and other music from around the world. 135
Efforts to launch a successful radio propaganda campaign against the Arbenz
government in Guatemala were done with great care by the CIA. Knowing that the
Guatemalan government controlled three of the nation‟s most powerful radio
transmitters, the Agency needed to devise a way by which to ensure that its broadcasts
were heard without jamming by the Guatemalan government. Analysis of the same CIA
report that showed the enjoyment of Latin Americans to good music programs also
revealed the extent to which the Arbenz government subdued political opposition
135
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broadcasted through radio. Although no mandatory laws were enacted under Arbenz to
suppress political opposition in the media, the government prevented many of the
political parties which opposed the government to fully state their political agenda over
the airwaves. For example, in a 1951 mayoral election held in Guatemala City,
opposition candidates for the position were allotted specific times to state their agenda on
the government-controlled radio broadcasts. However, the opposition candidates were
only allowed to do this two weeks prior to the election and their speeches were often cut
short when compared to the pro-government candidate. Also, on an occasion where an
opposition candidate was scheduled to appear, the radio anchor announced that the
candidate failed to show up for his scheduled broadcast without giving reason for the
candidate‟s lack of reliability. 136
The CIA estimated that about 2.4 percent of the Guatemalan population owned a
radio set capable of receiving Radio Liberación with an additional 5000 sets available in
public places. This estimation was compared to 13 percent in Cuba, 5 percent in Mexico,
and 4 percent in Costa Rica who owned radios.137 The knowledge of exactly who owned
the radio sets and where these people were located proved to be very important
intelligence for the CIA as it began to plan the programs for its target audience. Knowing
that a large segment of radio audiences in Guatemala were female listeners, the CIA
regularly used two men and one woman radio announcer on Radio Liberación. The
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woman announcer was picked specifically as a means to target the female listeners. 138
The program that the female announcer hosted was called “La Mujer y la Patria:
Opiniones Femeninas Sobre el Problema Comunista” or “The Woman and the
Fatherland: Feminine Opinions about the Communist Problem.” The program contained
many references to the roles of women in everyday life. Striking out against
communism, the female announcer called upon women as voters to not allow
communism to succeed. She proceeded to educate the female listeners on how
communism comes to dominate a society. 139 Because communism failed in many parts
of the world to attract women, the female broadcaster of Radio Liberación stated to the
listeners that communists created an Infant Protection program to convince women to
align themselves with the communist movement. The announcer stated on May 20, 1954
on the 8:00 PM broadcast of Radio Liberación that it was time for the women of
Guatemala to stand up and resist communism by creating an Infant Protection program of
its own.140 The attempts by communists to curb infant mortality rates were designed to
gain the support of mothers. The female announcer told Guatemalan women that they
did not need to support communism to create social welfare programs. Rather, as a
segment of the population that obtained the right to vote and with it the ability to
influence Guatemalan politics nine years earlier, it was up to them to advance these
programs through the ballot box.
The CIA‟s main target audience with its clandestine radio programs was the urban
middle and upper classes of Guatemalan society in areas such as Guatemala City and
138

See Central Intelligence Agency, “Materials for Psychological Warfare Support–Guatemala,” 7; Central
Intelligence Agency, “PBSUCCESS: The SHERWOOD Tapes,” 7.
139
Expansion of voting rights to literate women occurred with the liberal constitution written on March 13,
1945. See Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 32-33.
140
Central Intelligence Agency, “PBSUCCESS: The SHERWOOD Tapes,” 144

67

Quetzeltenango. As evidenced by the 5000 radio sets placed in Guatemala City before
the launch of Radio Liberación, however, the CIA also knew that there was a strong
chance that industrial workers, and those that were less educated, may have the
opportunity to listen to the broadcasts as well. In order to ensure that the CIA did not fail
at an opportunity to sway the opinion of this segment of the Guatemalan public, it
incorporated humor into its radio programming. The program “Miscelanea Musical del
Aire” was specifically aimed at the less educated. For example, on May 6 on the 7:00
PM program, a humorous joke at Jacobo Arbenz was inserted into the broadcast. One
man said to another, “Oh, what a beautiful mule!” and the other man replied by declaring
“That‟s a picture of Jacobo.”141 Straightforward and satirical, the statement was directed
at uneducated workers. Because much of the other propaganda on the radio station was
too complex for the uneducated to fully understand, the use of humor played a major role
in the CIA‟s ability to relay its message to this group of people in Guatemala. At the
time of the broadcasts, the literacy rate in the country was substandard. 142 Most of the
indigenous population (about 60 to 70 percent of Guatemalan people) could not read and
write while the Ladino population (about 30 to 40 percent who were either pure European
or mestizo ancestry) was mostly semiliterate. Estimates on literacy rates indicated that 75
percent of the population was illiterate and as many 95 percent of the Guatemalan
indigenous population could not read or write.143 Precisely accurate numbers were
irrelevant but close numbers did help the CIA to determine how much effort needed to be
focused on programs directed toward semiliterate and illiterate people.
141
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The humor on the radio programs used by the CIA did not just poke fun at Jacobo
Arbenz. The satire was also directed at the president‟s wife and members of his cabinet.
In one recording played on May 4 for the 7:00 PM broadcast, the president‟s wife, Maria,
exclaimed that she never realized that an English woman could weigh so much after
reading a newspaper article that said that she lost over 3000 pounds. On the same
broadcast, the humor was directed at the Guatemalan Economic Minister, Roberto Fanjul.
When Fanjul stated that he had difficulty training his horse and asked a horse trainer how
he managed to train his horse so well, the trainer responded that the first rule to training
the horse was that its trainer needed to be smarter than the horse.144 Although these
humorous outtakes helped to maintain the interest of the radio station‟s listeners, each
also had an ulterior motive. As the satire was aimed at discrediting Jacobo Arbenz and
others loyal to him, the CIA believed that the audience most likely to enjoy this portion
of the programming was also the most likely to infer that its leader and his cohorts were
inept at running the country. Much of the sixty percent of the population that was
ambivalent to Arbenz was not well informed about their president.145 The Agency used
this to its advantage on the radio as it became the best source for information about
Arbenz during a time when Guatemalan politics were unraveling. It was not difficult for
the CIA to acquire the intelligence necessary to create these satirical jokes. A U.S.
journalist who traveled to Guatemala interviewed government officials like Victor
Emmanuel Gutierrez, Guatemala‟s Chief of the Confederation of Labor. When asked
about how the confederation managed to acquire so much power on such little payments
for union dues ($3000 for approximately 35000 members), Gutierrez responded by
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stating that the confederation did not have many annual expenses. This information
showed that this government agency was likely acquiring money from an undocumented
source (communists). In its efforts to discredit the government, this intelligence was
invaluable to the CIA because it allowed the Agency to broadcast truths in its political
satire rather than speculating and fabricating information about the government officials.
The CIA learned that peasants voted for whomever the ruling party told them to vote for.
146

By instilling a lack of credibility in the Arbenz government, the chances of swaying

the peasants‟ political orientation became much greater.
Aside from the political satire used by the Agency in its clandestine radio
programs, there were two songs played on the airwaves that contained subtle references
to the dangers of communism. Both of the songs were performed by a group named “Los
Trinqueteros” and each of the songs debuted on the radio station in May 1954. Referring
to the assassination of Arbenz‟s political opponent, Francisco Arana, in 1949, the lyrics
of the song “La Profesia” (“The Profession”) stated that Arbenz would pay for coming to
power through treason.147 The refrain of the song, sang at the beginning and repeated in
the last verse, read as follows: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; Jacobo Arbenz,
you are going to pay…”148 The second of the two songs, debuting on May 22, became
the banner song of the Castillo Armas‟ Army of Liberation. In the song, many of the
lyrics offered promises of hope of Arbenz‟s ouster noting that the Guatemalan people had
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suffered under his rule, but would soon be liberated by the trinqueteros. The language
used in the song was a rural Guatemalan dialect which the CIA managed to use to its
advantage. Knowing that many peasants living in Guatemala spoke indigenous variants
of Spanish, the CIA incorporated this into these songs sung by Los Trinqueteros.149 The
CIA took into consideration the fact that the Arbenz administration sought to improve the
plight of the peasantry within Guatemala and counteracted it with a promise that reform
would still come through the impending coup.
By obtaining the interest of the peasantry in the country through its entertainment
segments, and knowing the low literacy rates of many of these people, the CIA
emphasized patience to its listeners on its “Miscelanea Musical del Aire” program. After
more than a week of broadcasted attacks against the Guatemalan government, and with
discontent already beginning to grow within the country, the CIA could not risk a popular
uprising more than a month before the scheduled invasion by Castillo Armas‟ forces. It
urged its listeners on May 11 to remain tranquil as the Arbenz government was
attempting to entrap many of the clandestine radio station‟s listeners. The announcer
stated to the audience “you will have your fun, but not yet.”150 This proved to be critical
for the CIA. For the operation to succeed, it needed the support of a large segment of the
population. If many of the supporters of the counterrevolution were imprisoned due to
their support for the conspirators working against the Arbenz government, the operation
could fail or, at the very least, the CIA‟s role in the operation could be exposed.
149
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Breakdown of the Broadcasts
When Radio Liberación commenced its operating schedule on May 1, 1954,
Guatemalans could listen to the station twice a day in two one-hour segments: between
7:00-8:00 AM and 9:00-10:00 PM. On May 13, the evening broadcasts began at 8:00
PM and lasted for two hours until May 27 when it, again, began at 9:00 PM. When the
fighting broke out in the countryside on June 18, Radio Liberación began to broadcast
developments every 45 minutes to an hour.151 The times selected were pivotal to its
audience. Most workers in Guatemala were unable to listen to the broadcasts during the
day. Because all of the broadcasts were created and played using cassette tapes, the
Agency was not able to supply a “live” broadcast. Prior to the launch of Radio
Liberación, the Agency obtained six and a half hours of cassette recordings of
Guatemalan radio programs in order to better coordinate its own broadcasts. These
recordings included the “top ten” songs that were played on Guatemalan radio in the
spring of 1954.152 When the CIA sought to obtain recordings of marimba music, the
popular and traditional genre of music within Guatemala, it found that these records were
difficult to locate. As a result, the Agency hired, at the cost of $800, professional
musicians to record marimba music at a studio in New York City. 153 With the marimba
recordings and the commercial cassette tapes of other musical genres assembled for
Radio Liberación broadcasts, the CIA gathered enough musical entertainment to launch
151
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the radio psychological warfare campaign. These programs gave the Agency the ability
to gain the attention of the Guatemalan population and also to maintain it.
On May 1, when the station began its broadcasts, the announcers explained radio
broadcasts‟ format. Morning broadcasts were to begin with popular music and “jokes
about the personalities of our sad political situation.” The announcers also stated that the
broadcasts would contain more serious segments about Jacobo Arbenz followed by
exquisite music. Evening broadcasts were to contain modern music followed by serious
segments, again attacking the government and closed with marimba music. The first
week‟s broadcasts followed this format, containing political commentary interspersed
with popular music such as Dean Martin‟s “When the Moon Hits Your Eye like a Big
Pizza Pie”.154 Four separate music programs incorporated many of the suggestions taken
from the letters of Latin American listeners to radio programs emanating from the United
States. “Descanso en Ritmo” played the top hits from North America, mostly from the
U.S., “En Alas de la Musica Que no Reconoce Fronteras” featured music from around the
world, “Miscelanea Musical del Aire” presented music with a local flavor such as the
very popular marimba music, and “Baile al Compas que le Toquen” played music that
poked fun at the politicians in the Arbenz regime. 155 Knowing that Latin American
listeners had a choice of where to obtain their news and political commentary from, it
was important to supplement its broadcasts with familiar music in order to keep the
people tuned in so they could hear the political messages as well.
By establishing from the outset a program lineup that contained entertainment
along with political commentary attacking the Arbenz government, the CIA managed to
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accumulate a fairly significant listening audience. Had the CIA simply broadcast
political commentary, the station likely may have continued to operate but the audience
would have dwindled, essentially making Radio Liberación useless in the overall
operation. Because of the entertainment, the CIA managed to maintain a listening
audience throughout the two months that its clandestine radio station broadcasted the
propaganda into Guatemala, transmitting the critical commentary that struck fear into the
Guatemalan people and destroyed the Arbenz government. Radio Liberación ceased
operating on July 2, 1954; five days after Jacobo Arbenz resigned the presidency. The
transmitter was packed away and shipped back to the United States and nearly all of the
CIA‟s American operatives left the country in time to celebrate the Fourth of July back in
the United States. After the operation in Guatemala, the CIA was changed forever. “The
triumph showed what could be accomplished through covert action, and its lessons,
learned and unlearned, would have ramifications for years to come.” 156
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Conclusion
This research project has tried to show how the CIA, by obtaining psychological
intelligence prior to the launch of Operation PBSUCCESS, managed to carry out a very
effective propaganda campaign against Jacobo Arbenz‟s government. All told, the
psychological warfare effort was devastating for the reformist president of Guatemala.
Within weeks after this campaign commenced, Arbenz tried desperately to open
diplomatic discussions with Dwight Eisenhower to save himself from being overthrown,
even if he had to travel to Washington to meet with Eisenhower himself. This last ditch
effort was rejected by the U.S. president and the rest of his diplomatic corp. U.S.
ambassador John Peurifoy relayed to the Guatemalan Foreign Minister that as long as
communism remained influential in Guatemala talks between the two presidents would
not accomplish anything.157 By May 1954, plans to depose Arbenz were nearing
completion. Time Magazine quoted Ambassador Peurifoy as stating that American
officials in Guatemala were “sending out Fourth of July invitations” and not including
any of the present Guatemalan government officials on the guest list. 158 Because of this,
the psychological warfare campaign was extremely important to insuring that the
operation succeeded.
When the foray into Guatemala began on June 18, 1954 by a small exile force led
by Castillo Armas, Radio Liberación played a key role in exaggerating the upheaval
caused by the invading exiles. In the six weeks prior to “D-Day”, the clandestine radio
station amassed a large audience that included Arbenz and many members of his
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government.159 After jamming the Guatemalan government‟s radio communications,
Radio Liberación became the outlet by which Guatemalans received updates on the battle
between the forces of Arbenz and Castillo Armas. When aircraft piloted by Americans
flew over Guatemala City dropping gasoline-filled soda bottles and sticks of dynamite
meant to resemble conventional bombs, to create panic and an illusion that the city was
under bombardment, the radio station reported that liberation forces bombed military
targets and destroyed the Santa Barbara arms storage facility that held many of the
weapons imported from Czechoslovakia aboard the Alfhem. After the Arbenz
government reported that it fired anti-aircraft weaponry and struck one of the bombers
and revealed that the bomber was flown by American pilots, Radio Liberación responded
with a fictitious story that a Mexican investigation showed that the plane was actually a
single-engine tourist plane on flight to Colombia and that anti-aircraft guns did not
damage the plane as the Guatemalan government suggested.160 As tensions reached a
climax, Arbenz‟s last efforts to save his government were lost. Radio Liberación
produced a story that discredited Arbenz‟s accusations that the United States intervened,
for the time maintaining the deniability for the CIA in the coup and rendering the Arbenz
government unable to charge the U.S. for its role.
When the dust settled, Arbenz had no choice but to resign from office, effective
June 27, 1954. The 1944 revolution that held much hope and promise for tens-ofthousands of Guatemalan peasants was overturned, and eventually the nation entered into
a forty-year civil war that took the lives of many people. Nearly sixty years have passed
since this event took place in Guatemala and recently, many have come forward asking
159
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that the United States issue a formal apology for its role in the coup. On October 22,
2011, Guatemalan president Alvaro Colom handed Arbenz‟s son a formal letter of
apology for the events that occurred in June 1954. “„As president of the republic, as
commander in chief of the army, I want to apologize to the Arbenz family for that great
crime committed on the 27th of June of 1954…Guatemala changed that day, and we
haven‟t yet recovered” were the words spoken by Colom. Author Stephen Schlesinger
asserted that “[t]he fake broadcasts and bombings „put such fear in the small country‟ that
it just collapsed…”161 If and when the United States does apologize for its role in the
1954 operation, the fact remains that the event has occupied an important place in the
historiography of U.S.-Latin American relations since the 1950s. In the future, as more
new evidence becomes available it is likely that historians will continue to research the
event in attempts to find new clues about how the United States interventionist policies
affected the approximately three million inhabitants of a small Central American country.
Although this research project on the CIA propaganda campaign against Jacobo
Arbenz narrates American intervention in Guatemala in 1954 through a unique lens, State
Department and CIA documents only explain the efforts made by the Agency to obtain
the psychological intelligence so crucial to carrying out the operation. These documents
reveal that the campaign was quite effective in destabilizing the Arbenz government but
do not tell the entire story. The purpose of this project was to examine the efforts made
by the CIA to accumulate and put into action psychological intelligence. The question
remains as to the specific effectiveness on different segments of the Guatemalan
population. The answer to that question likely can be revealed by researching journals,
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diaries, memoirs, and other documents left behind by the people who lived through this
episode of Guatemalan history; many of which are likely long deceased. The future of
study on Operation PBSUCCESS is not a matter of researching the rights and wrongs of
U.S. participation in the event. Instead, it is more important to consider the impacts of
specific subthemes related to the event (i.e. propaganda) on those most affected by it.

Operation PBSUCCESS was the first of many covert operations conducted by the
CIA in Latin America during the Cold War. The triumph of the Agency in this affair set
a precedent for future operations, most notably the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.
Similar to the Guatemalan intervention, the CIA recruited exiles to lead an invasion to
overthrow Fidel Castro. The difference between the two, though, was that in Guatemala,
the invaders succeeded while in Cuba, they failed miserably. The failure embarrassed the
United States and specifically the CIA. Why did one operation succeed while the other
failed? Arguments that Castro had far greater support in Cuba than Arbenz in Guatemala
are viable. However, the assessments made by CIA operatives in 1954 showed that 75
percent of the Guatemalan population either supported Arbenz or, at the very least, did
not oppose his policies. The largest difference between PBSUCCESS and the Bay of
Pigs invasion is the fact that the CIA conducted a much more effective psychological
warfare campaign in Guatemala. The Agency did not sufficiently “create the climate for
regime change” in Cuba as it did in Guatemala. The psychological intelligence gathered
on the Guatemalan population enabled the CIA to convince wealthy, urban Guatemalans
and much of its military leaders to retract their support for Arbenz. Without this, the
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operation was doomed to fail. 162 In Cuba, Castro had the support of most of the
population. Multiple U.S. interventions in the country from 1898-1958 produced a
population that, at the very least, supported defiance of U.S. policy. The lessons from
Guatemala that the Agency failed to take into account was that the U.S. developed very
strong psychological intelligence and understood Guatemalan culture to the degree that it
could influence most of the people of the country to turn their backs on Arbenz. The CIA
failed despondently in Cuba to accomplish this. Future research to better connect the two
covert operations is something that can and should be conducted to better understand the
role of psychological intelligence (or lack thereof) in covert operations that succeeded or
failed.
As this study has tried to show, without psychological intelligence, the CIA‟s
intervention in Guatemala would not have achieved the results that it did. The
Guatemalan Revolution of 1944 was a welcomed change for the vast majority of
Guatemalan people. Political propaganda, although impossible to leave out as being the
major cause of the destabilization of Guatemala, could not have been broadcast over the
radio or in Guatemalan Catholic churches if not for the CIA‟s extensive research on the
culture of the country. Thus, it can be concluded that, when considering all of the
complex factors at play that allowed this operation to succeed, psychological intelligence
played the most important role.
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